

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Walter R. Mansfield, of New York, to be a U.S. circuit judge, second circuit.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of William Hughes Mulligan, of New York, to be a U.S. circuit judge, second circuit.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

#### U.S. DISTRICT COURTS

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to read sundry nominations in the U.S. district courts.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the nominations be considered en bloc.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nominations are considered and confirmed en bloc.

#### DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Jack T. Stuart, of Mississippi, to be a U.S. marshal for the southern district of Mississippi for the term of 4 years.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

#### U.S. MINT

The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Jack Herbert Keller, of Pennsylvania, to be Assayer of the Mint of the United States at Philadelphia, Pa.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I am glad to see the confirmation, as Assayer of the Mint of the United States at Philadelphia of Jack Herbert Keller, of Pennsylvania. He is a man for whom we have the highest regard. This honor which comes to him now is well deserved and I am very much pleased that he has been so appointed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President be immediately notified of the confirmation of these nominations.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate resume the consideration of legislative business.

The motion was agreed to, and the Senate resumed the consideration of legislative business.

#### ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the standing order, the distinguished

majority leader is now recognized. Does he wish to speak?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I have no remarks at this time.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

#### TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, there will now be a period for the transaction of routine morning business, not to exceed 30 minutes, with statements therein limited to 3 minutes.

#### DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METRO SYSTEM

Mr. SPONG. Mr. President, the supplemental appropriation bill passed last night by the Senate contains the District of Columbia contribution of \$34 million for construction of the area's metro system. Although the House did not include these funds in its version of the bill, I am hopeful that the House conferees will accept the Senate provision.

Mr. President, a great deal depends upon prompt release of this money. The Metro system is already experiencing difficulties in the bond market where investors quite properly insist upon some assurance that the subway system will be built and will be built according to the original 98-mile plan. The continued delay in releasing the District of Columbia's contribution not only weakens Metro's position in the bond market, but it is unfair to the local jurisdictions of Northern Virginia and Maryland which have scrupulously lived up to their agreement.

Mr. President, I am not unsympathetic to the desire of certain House Members to see progress in the construction of new highways in the Washington area. These highways will be necessary to help carry the predicted traffic increase of the next decade. Only a balanced transportation system that includes both subway and adequate highways will meet the area's needs. In this connection, it should be noted that the subway system was designed with the highways in mind and unless that construction is undertaken, the subway system would be inadequate from its first day of operation.

Nevertheless, just as we cannot afford to emphasize the subway to the neglect of highways, we cannot insist upon highways at the cost of jeopardizing the subway system. In short, we need balanced transportation and we may need legislation which will assure that balanced transportation will become available.

For that reason, should the conference committee not approve the District of Columbia money in this supplemental, I intend to propose as a rider to either the fiscal year 1972 appropriation bill for the District of Columbia or the District of Columbia revenue bill, an amendment to tie highways and subway funds together. Under this amendment, money would be provided for both developments or there would be no money for either.

Mr. President, I would prefer not to

take this course of action and I hope it will not be necessary. I do want the Senate to know, however, that I will not stand by while the subway is allowed to wither from failure of the Federal Government to honor its obligation.

#### CHANGE OF REFERENCE OF A NOMINATION

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, at the request of the distinguished Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS), I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Finance be discharged from the further consideration of the nomination of Merlin K. DuVal, Jr., of Arizona, to be Assistant Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, which was referred to that committee on May 13, 1971, and that the nomination be referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare for appropriate consideration and action.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BENTSEN). Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### QUORUM CALL

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SAXBE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### LEAVE OF ABSENCE

Mr. SAXBE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the senior Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) be granted official leave of the Senate from duty to the close of business Thursday, May 27, 1971.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### QUORUM CALL

Mr. SAXBE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SCHWEIKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### BREAKTHROUGH IN STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

Mr. SCHWEIKER. Mr. President, I rise to commend President Nixon for a truly significant breakthrough in our strategic arms limitation talks. The announcement at 12 noon today may well go down in history as the first real breakthrough in the arms race and the first real breakthrough in our situation in the cold war since World War II.

on an amendment to be offered by the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD) to title V of the pending amendment by the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER), with the time for debate on that amendment beginning after the foregoing vote, to be equally divided and controlled by the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD) and the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS);

*Provided further*, That a vote be taken not later than 7 p.m. on Wednesday, May 26, 1971, on an amendment to be offered by the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK) to title V of the pending amendment by the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER), with the time for debate, beginning after the vote on the amendment offered by the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), to be equally divided and controlled by the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK) and the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS);

*Provided further*, That a vote be taken at 4 o'clock p.m. on Tuesday, June 1, on title V of the amendment offered by the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER), as amended, if amended, with the time for debate, beginning after the vote on the amendment by the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK), to be equally divided and controlled by the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER) and the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS).

Mr. GRAVEL. I object.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Will the Senator withhold his objection?

Mr. SCOTT. Will the Senator withhold his objection and give us an opportunity to make comment?

Mr. GRAVEL. I reserve the right to object.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the distinguished assistant majority leader yield?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, we are faced with the fact that we have only a certain number of weeks in the year in which to get the country's business done before we go out to the people to apologize for it. If we are going to spend 6, 7, 8, or 10 weeks on each bill we will be here until Christmas, with a lot of unfinished business. We will be confronted with the same sorry, shabby mess we had at the end of the last session, which was a disgrace, in my opinion, in the way it was shuffled about, without adequate or constructive treatment in many cases, and I am not speaking critically of any individual, but Congress did not give a good accounting of itself.

Here we are doing our best to work out some sort of satisfactory agreement with Senators who have every right to be assured of adequate time on the consideration of each of their amendments. Various suggestions have been made and these suggestions would carry us so far into June there would hardly be time for the conferees to gather or for action to be taken and, thereby, we would be confronted with the situation that the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services has pointed out, which would be extremely unfortunate for the continued operation of the military services.

So the distinguished assistant majority leader, the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, and myself, with the approval of the distinguished majority leader, have proposed a unanimous-consent request. If that is not satisfactory, and the one suggested by some of the Senators does not seem to us to be

one which we could live with, speaking from the point of view of the party leadership, we do not feel we can indefinitely be a party to such delays in the Senate's business, as would bring the country down around our ears again.

Therefore, we are heading toward a situation, I regret to say, where we will have to present a cloture motion on the entire bill and all amendments thereto, and amendments to amendments, and see whether or not the Senate wants to get on with the business or whether the Senate is going to be confronted by continued and interminable delays. Again, I have no criticism of those Senators who agree to 3, 4, or even 5 hours on amendments. We are willing to accommodate ourselves to that end, but we cannot accommodate ourselves to the paralysis of the Senate's business. When it comes to that point, we are going to put the burden on the Senate. We are going to say to Senators, "We have done our best but we are going to be forced before very long to circulate a cloture motion and, if that fails, another and another and another, so that the country will know which Senators want to end the debate and which do not."

It is an unfortunate situation. I hate to say it. I think the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services would not normally favor cloture. I think he believes, as I do, in free and extended debate, but I am bound to make the statement, because I cannot meet my duties as leader on one side of the aisle unless I say it.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SCOTT. The Senator from Alaska has the floor.

Mr. GRAVEL. I am happy to yield.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, as our leaders have said here, we are faced with a situation where there must be action.

The power to induct under the Selective Service Act expires on June 30. Beginning with that date and counting back on the calendar I estimate that we must pass this bill not later than June 15, if we are to have adequate consideration, a conference, preparation of records, and the bill brought back here for final approval of the conference report, and then sent to the White House.

This subject matter is important, but it has been under consideration and debate off and on in this Chamber, in our committee, and elsewhere, since about June of last year when the major amendment was passed. We had most thorough and searching hearings. We have a complete report. There is unusual interest. In these amendments there is a question about sending draftees to Indochina; another question deals with withdrawal from Indochina by a certain date; another matter is the length and extension of the draft; and another question is the question of manpower levels. Those matters cannot be taken lightly.

As the leader has said there is no blood in my veins that wants to run in here and holler that a cloture motion will have to be applied for and voted. I have never voted for cloture. I have always made strong reservations in my mind and expressed them many times that if there

ever arose a situation where national security was involved I would be ready to make full acceptance.

There is no doubt in my mind that to carry on our military services, operations that are directly for the protection of our shorelines and our people—leaving out the war in Vietnam and troops in Europe, but only speaking of the operation of our missile bases, our carriers at sea, our polaris submarines, our ground missile groups, and many others—the record shows it is absolutely necessary under present conditions to have the inducement of the Selective Service Act. I feel I know what would happen if we did not have a continuation for a while; and I am willing to go all out, to a reasonable extent, to get it.

I appeal to the membership of this body. Let us join hands and settle our differences of opinion about the provisions of this bill in the right way, by argument, and then by vote, and put together whatever bill the majority of this body thinks we should.

May I just speak further now, I think in considering this bill, there are many amendments, and there is some choice about which ones will come up first. I do not control that, but we are going to spend the time here. However, I want to feel free, not to call up any amendment, but to debate it and discuss it after notifying the author that I want to discuss it. I want to get it in the Record, and before the press, and before the public, and I want to feel free to call up a Senator's amendment if necessary, and get it to be the pending business if possible, and start the debate on it if necessary. I do not want to do that, but something has to be done to get this bill passed.

I hope all Senators can agree now to some reasonable voting pattern. I will accommodate myself to almost anything. The leaders say they can accommodate themselves to the problem, but we will have to move the bill along. I put it up to our leaders in conference, and I put it to them now, and I know they are going to discharge it, but it falls on them as our chosen leaders to move this bill along as fast as they can, of course, in conformity with the rules and procedures of the Senate. I think a delay cannot be tolerated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Virginia?

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I object—

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I believe I have the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia has the floor.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I would like to make a few comments in answer to my distinguished colleague from Pennsylvania.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Alaska with the understanding that I retain my right to the floor.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, with respect to the comments of both distinguished Senators—and let me say for myself, I know the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER) and possibly the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES)

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times, there has seemed to be a tendency for some of the courts to undertake general oversight over the whole government, to second-guess officers of the executive branch in matters which would clearly seem to be of the sort which are properly allocated to the executive branch for decision.

Of course, executive officers should be kept within their proper limits. They are surely subject to the law and should be held to it. But executive officers have great responsibilities, particularly in these sometimes somewhat trying times. There is inevitably an ebb and flow in allocating the powers in this area. If there is something of an ebb in the assertion of judicial power at the present time, it is not clear to me that that is inconsistent with the course of history, and with the genius of our tri-partite governmental system.

But it is the legislative branch on which our interest focusses this evening. All federal legislative power is in the hands of 535 men in Washington, and we are gathered this evening to attest our friendship and respect for one of them. The task of Congress, and of Congressional leadership, is an awesome one. As I have sat on various boards and committees from time to time, I have often pondered about the process by which group decisions are made. It is hard enough to come to a conclusion in a group of five or eight or twelve. Think how difficult it is when there are 435 members in the House of Representatives—and they cannot function unless they can get the concurrence of a majority of the Senate, with 100 members, representing rather different interests. The wonder is, I suppose, that any legislative progress is made. And sometimes it is discouragingly slow. There are many problems in the organization of Congress, in its committee structure, in its time-consuming procedures, and its failure to find a way to let the majority speak. Yet Congress is a deliberative body, and it is wise to see that there is ordinarily appropriate deliberation on the important matters that come before it.

Too many people forget too often that government is inevitably the resultant of many competing forces. On the legislative side, these are focused through Congress. On most questions, effective government can only be achieved through compromise. In a democratic government, many decisions are made with which many persons disagree, sometimes deeply. As we were long ago told, "Politics is the art of the possible." Or, as Winston Churchill wrote about his ancestor, the Duke of Marlborough, "The best obtainable was nearly always good enough for him." Very few people can be successful in politics if they are doctrinaire. Perhaps Charles Sumner, who represented this Commonwealth in the Senate a century and more ago, is an exception, but he served during an unusual period, and his recent biographer makes it seem unlikely that it would be wise for anyone to try to emulate him. One is reminded of the definition of a fanatic—he is doing what God would do if He only understood the facts.

If compromise is the essence of government, particularly on the legislative side, the caliber and the character of the people in Congress becomes of first importance. There is, of course, partisanship in Congress, and that is as it should be, for that is part of the process of reaching the consensus which Congress is expected to formulate. But most of the problems that confront the country are not partisan problems. They are real problems, directly affecting masses of human beings. There will always be differences of opinion about how to resolve these problems. But there should be few differences about the ultimate objective, which is a better, freer, cleaner country, in which every citizen has an opportunity to make his own way,

freed at least from poverty and discrimination. In large measure our task is to establish national priorities, for we cannot all at once do all of the things that ought to be done.

On such questions we need men who can provide constructive leadership, men who can make moral and humane judgments. I know of no one who is better qualified to make such judgments than Father Drinan. It was a century and a half ago that Goethe said: "We hear many complaints about the growing immorality of our times, but I see no reason why anybody who wants to be moral should not be so all the more, and with all the more credit." I may not always agree with Father Drinan, but I will never doubt that in his heart he is on the right side. We can ask no more, of a man, or of a legislator.

Perhaps there is a time for me to do a little lobbying. I hope that Father Drinan will look with favor on President Nixon's welfare proposals, which are measures, I think, whose time has come. And then there is revenue sharing. Perhaps the President's proposals can be improved. No one asks a legislator to be a rubber stamp. But the basic scheme is one with great possibilities. Too long the states and the federal government have been fighting each other; this proposal will help them to work together. Finally, since Father Drinan is a member of the House Committee on Internal Security, I would ask him to do what he can to advance the bill which would repeal the provision of the McCarron Act, passed twenty years ago over President Truman's veto, which sets up detention camps in this country. This law has always been an embarrassment to the executive branch, as well as an affront to our citizens. The present administration has sought its repeal, and I charge Father Drinan, who is at least closer to the seat of power on such matters than any of the rest of us are, to bring it about.

There is much impatience in the land. Some of this is understandable. It is only human to want what you want and to want it now. To a considerable extent, the impatience is good, for it is a source of motive power, and that is always needed in a democracy. But the results in government are not produced by impatience. They are produced by people. Some of the problems are extraordinarily difficult. In the long run, however, they will be resolved only by the thought and effort of the people who work on them, and eventually by the votes of our representatives in Congress.

In a sense, I am sorry to see Father Drinan leave the law school world. He was an important figure there, not only for his teaching and scholarship and energy and enthusiasm, but because of his example, and his stimulation to his students to make themselves count. But in a larger sense, I am glad that he has gone to Congress. It is not that he is the first Catholic priest in Congress, though I welcome that, for it means the breaking down of a barrier which has divided us. It is not just that he is a law school dean who has made good in the larger world, though I welcome that, for I have long believed that American law schools should not be ivory towers. It is not just that he is a scholar in politics. We have room for that, and his scholarship will help. It is rather because of the kind of man he is, quite apart from his cloth. By this, I do not impugn the countless other members of Congress who are honest, upright, moral and humane. But to me, there is something very refreshing that Father Drinan is a member of our American Congress. I know that you join with me in tribute and respect to him, and in that deep warmth which comes when one salutes a friend.

May God be with you, Father Bob.

## SALT TALKS

HON. MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 11, 1971

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Speaker, the United States is today engaged in Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union, aimed at deescalating the arms race. At least this is our public intent; our private interest is less discernible.

There is a growing realization that we are rapidly developing weapons systems while erstwhile espousing the cause of limitation. While preaching disarmament we are stoking our own fires.

Perhaps one of the first attempts at analyzing this situation has been done by Samuel Orr in a two-part series for the National Journal. He focuses on how policy is developed for U.S. participation in the SALT talks as well as covering the issues involved and reaction to the administration's handling of the negotiations.

It is one of the most knowledgeable and in-depth accounts of the SALT talks to date and I recommend it to my colleagues.

### PART I

DEFENSE REPORT/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL NETWORK GIVES WHITE HOUSE TIGHT REIN OVER SALT STRATEGY

(By Samuel C. Orr)

The United States is tucking more systems into its nuclear weapons belt, while calmly talking with the Soviet Union about halting, or at least easing, the burgeoning arms race.

This arm-while-you-talk policy is the handiwork of an elaborate apparatus created by the Nixon Administration to control U.S. participation in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union.

The intermittent talks, now in their fourth round at Vienna, began 16 months ago.

Controversy: The U.S. policy-making machinery for SALT is often and operated by the White House through the National Security Council. The full-time engineer is Henry A. Kissinger, assistant to the President for national security affairs and NSC staff director.

Under the guidance of the complex NSC interdepartmental system, almost all aspects of the U.S. strategic weapons program would receive substantial increases under the proposed \$76-billion defense budget for fiscal 1972.

Some arms-control supporters say that the Nixon-Kissinger policy jeopardizes chances of any meaningful agreement at SALT. They fear that continued arms escalation will generate countermeasures by the Soviets at a time when the two superpowers are roughly balanced in deterrent strength, and thus are in a good position to negotiate an arms limitation pact.

But Administration spokesmen defend the strategy as essential to keep pressure on the Soviets in the negotiations.

The United States, they say, is in danger of losing its superiority in weaponry and technology within a few years, and cannot unilaterally surrender any of its bargaining chips at SALT.

Administration officials also defend the NSC-dominated policy-making mechanism. They argue that it gives consideration to the viewpoints of all interested agencies—from the giant Pentagon to the tiny Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

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## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks

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change for the good. We are all Americans. We all believe deeply in freedom of religion, as well as many other things. Surely it is meet that we should work together.

But there are other reasons for my being a bit surprised that I am here tonight. You know, when Father Drinan came to be Dean of the Boston College Law School, I resented it a little bit. This was because I had come to have such high regard for Father Kennealy that I hated to see him give up his leadership of this fine law school. I still have that high regard for Father Kennealy; but I have found that there is room for high regard for Father Drinan, too. In the course of my years in Cambridge, I had many contacts with him, in many fields—in relations between our two law schools, which were, I think, good, in relations with the American Bar Association, and with the United States Commission on Civil Rights. I soon found that Father Drinan was an activist, and a working activist. When there was work to be done, he was doing it. He was one of the principal founders of the Section of Family Law of the American Bar Association. He was Chairman of the Massachusetts State Advisory Committee to the Civil Rights Commission. And now he is a Congressman.

(Years ago, thinking I knew him fairly well, I tried to write to him as "Dear Bob". But my good Secretary always made it "Dear Father Bob." Of course, I did not mean any disrespect, quite the contrary. But he will be Father Bob tonight.)

For further reasons for surprise at my being here, I will observe that he is a Democratic Congressman, and I am a Republican, serving in a Republican administration. I may add, too, that Father Bob defeated a Harvard Law School graduate in becoming a Congressman. But despite all these differences—perhaps because of them—I am glad to be here tonight. In less time than it usually takes for an outsider to be accepted here, Father Bob has made himself a citizen of this community, and I am happy to join with you in paying great respect to him, and to his fruitful, and for a churchman, unusual career in the law.

With these preliminaries, I will turn to the theme of my talk tonight, which is that the greatest achievement of mankind on earth is effective self-government—greater than nuclear physics, or putting a man on the moon, greater than art or music or literature, though one of the fruits of effective self-government is that they may flourish. I do not overlook religion, but for many it has an outside source. For government, though, we are on our own.

Of course, fully effective self-government is never accomplished. There are always problems. We are always striving. We do a good deal if we keep the ship afloat and generally moving ahead. Those of us who have grown up with our system sometimes take it for granted, and do not recognize how inherently complicated it is. We are a country of more than two hundred million people, a number which has considerably more than doubled in my lifetime. We are a people of widely divergent backgrounds and interests, inevitably divided into interest groups, factions and sects. We are geographically divided into fifty states, some relatively small and simple, some huge. New York and California, for example, have more people than nearly all of the members of the United Nations.

We are a country of paradoxes. We have, I believe, more freedom than any country in history, yet many of us are more concerned about our freedom than at any time in the past. We have great national wealth, widely spread, yet we also have great poverty in this country. The figures show that the average per capita income is higher now than at any previous time in history; and the number living in poverty is proportionately lower than any time before. Yet we

are, I think, more concerned than ever before.

We have a beautiful country, filled with natural resources, which, in the past, we have squandered. We have an economy which is based on growth. Indeed, this has been a kind of religion of the economists. Some years ago, when I was on a Committee at the Brookings Institution, I asked in the course of our discussions: "What is so good about growth?" The shock that resulted was clearly discernible. It was equally clear that I made no converts. Yet most of our problems are the consequence of growth, of the rapid increase in our population, and the escalation of consumer demands. For years we have totted up the Gross National Product, with evident satisfaction, and without taking into account any of the negative factors involved, such as the costs which should have been incurred to control pollution. We have treated the air and the water and the soil and the beauty around us as inexhaustible. Now we know they are not. Fortunately, through our great governmental machine, we are beginning to do something about it.

But how do we go about doing something about this, or any other large scale problem? There is little, if anything, which is monolithic about our governmental structure. In the first place, we are divided into fifty states, and literally thousands of counties and cities and political subdivisions in those states. And this is good. There are things we do in Massachusetts which do not concern the people of Texas or California—and vice versa. Even in the states and subdivisions, we usually achieve results through representatives. The essence of our government state and federal, is representing democracy. Thus the individual citizen is rather remote from decision making, though we should not forget that this is inevitable in a country as large as ours. The citizen has his opportunity to vote; and there are various ways in which he can make his voice heard. Whether he can bring about any change in results, however, depends on how many other citizens feel as he does. For we do believe, on most things, in majority rule. The thoughtful citizen understands this, and does not become frustrated when government does not go his way. Instead he works harder to find ways to bring about the result he wants—or accepts the majority's decision if he finds little likelihood that a change can be achieved.

We have a federal government, too, as well as state and local governments. And there are many difficult lines to draw between state and federal powers. Generally speaking, for example, the responsibility for the control of crime is with the states. Burglary and robbery, assault and battery, murder and manslaughter—including death on the highways—are state matters, with which our state authorities are struggling valiantly. But if you rob a post office, that is a federal crime, since the Constitution allocates post offices to the federal government. And if you rob a national bank or most state banks, that is a federal crime, too, since most banks are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, an organization which Congress has established in the exercise of its power to regulate interstate commerce, and to regulate the value of money.

Recently I had a case before the Supreme Court which involved the question whether "loan sharking" could be made a federal crime, without any proof that there was any effect on interstate commerce in the particular case. The case was a sad one. A young man had worked in a butcher shop for ten years. He decided to set up his own shop, and got off to a good start. He wanted to expand. He needed \$2,000 to increase his inventory, and to put in shelves and counters. His credit standing would not enable him to get a loan from the bank, and the Small Business Administration said it was inter-

ested but that it would take six to eight weeks to process his application. At that point a friend said that he could get the money from Louey at the corner beer hall. So he went to see Louey, who said he would have to see his people, and shortly returned with the money. To make a long story short, after a few months, he had paid back \$3,000 on the \$2,000 loan and still owed \$5,000. Threats were made to his wife and to him. He sold out his establishment at a heavy loss—and told the police. The defendant, who had made the loan to him, was prosecuted under the Consumer Credit Act of 1968—a section of the Truth in Lending Law, passed by Congress. In writing the statute, Congress had tied its action to its power to regulate commerce by including extensive recitals about the relation of loan sharking to organized crime, and the deleterious effect of organized crime on interstate commerce.

The defendant claimed that his crime was merely local, and that there was no federal power to make it subject to prosecution in the federal courts. He lost, and there was thus established a new area for the application of a basic federal power.

I have mentioned this case not only because it involves the division between state and federal power in our governmental system, but also because it illustrates another device we have used in an effort to make our government workable and fair. This is the separation of powers. More than any other governmental system, I think, we have allocated powers to the three branches of the government, and have maintained a rather firm separation between them. Indeed, in many respects the success of our system depends upon the extent that each branch of our government (a) meets the responsibilities assigned to it, and (b) refrains from undertaking to exercise responsibilities properly allocated elsewhere.

What has been called "the least dangerous branch" is the judiciary. The responsibilities of the judiciary are very great, and we properly pay it great respect. We look to the judges to see that trials are fair, and that constitutional guarantees and legislatively established procedures are maintained. But the highest courts of the states, and particularly the United States Supreme Court, have the further and high responsibility of drawing the ultimate constitutional lines, such as that involved in my loan sharking case. There we had an example of all three branches in operation. Congress made the law, exercising a considered judgment of the representatives of the people that the exercise of federal power in this area is desirable and necessary. This was peculiarly a legislative matter, a complex and difficult one, hammered out in the committees and on the floor of Congress.

The law having been made by Congress, it became the duty of the executive branch to seek to enforce it. Under the Constitution, the President has the duty "to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." When complaint was made to the police in New York, the executive branch, through the Department of Justice, moved into operation and started a prosecution, in the federal court, since Congress had expressly authorized that action. It then became the responsibility of the courts, ultimately the Supreme Court, to decide whether, under the Constitution, Congress had power to make such conduct a federal crime.

For our government to work effectively, all three branches must play their role. In many periods of our history, the judicial branch has been rather passive, acting only in narrowly circumscribed ways on the cases that come before it. At other times, as in the recent past, the judicial branch has seemed to be more activist, reaching out for new areas in which to operate, sometimes extending old precedents beyond what they were commonly understood to stand for. Some-



we have to participate in this matter which so affects the lives and fortunes of all citizens.

This period of extension will also enable the Congress to have the benefit of 1 year's experience with those innovations contained in the bill that are designed to bring about an all-volunteer force before we are obliged again next year to decide whether the draft should be continued.

The most important of these innovations is reflected in the second amendment which I am cosponsoring. This amendment will substitute the amount of the \$2.7 billion pay increase as passed by the House for the approximately \$1 billion recommended by the administration.

As one who first called public attention to the spectacle of military families on welfare, I can do no less. For 13 years, from 1952 through 1964, the basic pay of enlisted men with less than 2 years service remained unchanged, and since 1966 personnel in this category have only received across-the-board increases which served to maintain their position of relative penury. Under the terms of the amendment which I am supporting, 86 percent of the increase authorized will go to enlisted men and junior officers with less than 2 years service, thus lifting virtually all in this category from below the poverty level of income.

If enacted, this pay increase, which will be close to the amount recommended by the Gates Commission as necessary to man a volunteer force, should also begin to test the assumption that increased compensation can in fact attract sufficient volunteers to man our Armed Forces.

It goes without saying that if the draft is to be retained, it must be made more equitable. A number of other amendments for this purpose will be offered, and I, of course, will support those which advance this purpose.

#### QUORUM CALL

Mr. SCHWEIKER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BUCKLEY). The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### THE SALT TALKS—PRESIDENT NIXON'S STATEMENT ON RADIO AND TELEVISION TODAY

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, today, at noon, the President of the United States made a brief statement on nationwide radio and television which is of singular importance to the Nation and, I think, to the world.

The President brought us a message of good news as it relates to the strategic arms limitation talks now being held in Vienna.

The substance of the President's statement is as follows:

The Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitation of strategic armaments, have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of antiballistic missile systems (ABM's). They have also agreed that, together with concluding an agreement to limit ABM's, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.

The two sides are taking this course in the conviction that it will create more favorable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic arms. These negotiations will be actively pursued.

Mr. President, this is part of the President's statement. I ask unanimous consent that the entire statement be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

#### REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. As you know, the Soviet-American talks on limiting nuclear arms have been deadlocked for over a year. As a result of negotiations involving the highest level of both governments, I am announcing today a significant development in breaking the deadlock.

The statement that I shall now read is being issued simultaneously in Moscow and Washington; in Washington at 12:00 o'clock and in Moscow at 7:00 p.m.

The Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitation of strategic armaments, have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of antiballistic missile systems (ABM's). They have also agreed that, together with concluding an agreement to limit ABM's, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.

The two sides are taking this course in the conviction that it will create more favorable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic arms. These negotiations will be actively pursued.

This agreement is a major step in breaking the stalemate on nuclear arms talks. Intensive negotiations, however, will be required to translate this understanding into a concrete agreement.

This statement that I have just read expresses the commitment of the Soviet and American Governments at the highest levels to achieve that goal. If we succeed, this joint statement that has been issued today may well be remembered as the beginning of a new era in which all nations will devote more of their energies and their resources not to the weapons of war, but to the works of peace.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I rise to commend this statement. The President's announcement concerning the SALT talks is encouraging. The understanding that we will proceed toward working out an agreement on limitation of the deployment of antiballistic missiles represents a significant first step in strategic nuclear arms control. The further understanding to seek an agreement on offensive weapons represents a major breakthrough in the SALT talks. These developments, I would point out, are in accord with the principles and suggestions which I made in my Senate speech on March 25.

The next step to slow down the arms race would be an understanding to freeze the deployment now of both offensive and defensive missiles.

On March 25, I was imploring the administration—the President and his representative at Vienna—to show considerable flexibility in the talks on strategic arms limitations.

I pointed out in the March 25 speech that the Soviet Union had indicated a desire or willingness to discuss a limitation on defensive missiles. At the time of the March 25 speech, the administration's position was that there had to be an agreement simultaneously on both offensive and defensive nuclear missiles.

Mr. President, it has been my view that progress in these strategic arms limitation talks should proceed step by step. I was of the mind, as I am now, that to try to arrive simultaneously at an agreement on both offensive and defensive weapons might be very difficult, if not impossible.

The President's announcement today subscribes to the procedure, first of all of seeking an agreement within this year on defensive weaponry. This agreement, of course, is conditioned upon the understanding that following the agreement on defensive missiles there would be work toward an agreement on offensive missiles.

This is exactly the position I pursued in my argument of March 25. I said at that time that whatever agreement would be arrived at on defensive missiles, should be linked to future agreements on offensive missiles.

The President's statement today tells us that the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the deployment of anti-ballistic-missile systems. Then, as a second step, these two countries have also agreed on the necessity of concluding an agreement to limit offensive strategic weapons one to follow the other.

Mr. President, I am so pleased that the administration has shown this flexibility. I do believe that matters of foreign policy, and national security, particularly with respect to arms control must be considered over and beyond any partisan questions. I believed that in my votes of yesterday on matters dealing with our NATO forces I believe that even more strongly with reference to arms control. The subject of arms control is one of the most serious ones facing this Government and, I think, one of the most important ones facing mankind.

It is my considered judgment that the building of weaponry does not gain new strength or new security, because it is matched by our adversary or, in this instance, the Soviet Union. In other words, there really is no way to get ahead. There is only a way, if we so desire, to elevate the level of danger by the arms race.

The other way is to lower the level of danger and the cost by a limitation on arms, what we call arms control agreements.

It should be noted that the statement of the President does not represent in unilateral reduction on our part. It represents a negotiation directed towards a mutual freeze of deployment or a mutual limitation on the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems. It represents an understanding to seek a mutual agreement on the limitation of

quoted a Department of Defense official as saying that post exchange and non-appropriated fund jobs were filled by American dependents if possible. This is a small minority of the civilian jobs in Europe with the U.S. Forces. Most civilian jobs are appropriated-fund jobs and most of these jobs are filled by Europeans.

To help lower ranking enlisted men in the U.S., there are many welfare services available. Federal Food Stamps and public assistance are available in many states. Military commissaries in the U.S. have been authorized to accept Federal Food Stamps from military families. In Europe there are commissaries near almost all military units, yet there is no way provided for families to buy food stamps in Europe. Even though U.S. servicemen in Europe pay federal and state taxes, they do not receive the many helpful services of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare or the services of the state welfare agencies.

The points so far mentioned in this discussion place a great deal of emotional stress upon the soldier, his family and his marriage. Nearly all of the married, lower ranking enlisted men are in the early years of their marriage—the adjustment period. The problems of the enlisted men mentioned in this paper are deterrents to the marriage adjustment of the U.S. soldier in Europe. Prolonged separations and financial difficulties in marriage are recognized by mental health professionals as deterrents to a happy marriage in the great majority of cases.

#### 4. Conclusions:

a. There are many military families living in poverty in Europe.

b. There are few jobs available in Europe for soldiers and American dependents to supplement family income.

c. There has been an ever-widening gap between the incomes of the lower ranking servicemen and that of the officers and NCO's.

d. Officers and NCO's receive many financial benefits that the lower ranking servicemen do not receive.

e. Welfare services for military families in Europe are few and inadequate.

f. The effectiveness of U.S. forces in Europe is being lowered by the social and emotional problems caused by the poverty of many of its members.

#### 5. Recommendations:

a. A sizable pay increase for lower ranking enlisted men to raise all military families above the poverty level.

This is the heart of the amendment that is before the Senate at this time. This is, in fact, the Hughes-Schweiker amendment. That is what it is designed to do. That is what it does. It does what the House has already had the courage to do—add \$1.7 billion to this bill for pay. It is the essence of what the Gates Commission and the former Secretary of Defense from Pennsylvania recommended in their study. This is what everyone who has anything to do with the problem is considering and recommending. Yet, here we are, on the floor of the Senate, battling for the right to have decent pay for our enlisted men.

b. "Command sponsorship" for all married servicemen to include these financial benefits: dislocation allowance, travel pay for all dependents, station allowance for high cost housing areas, government shipment of household goods.

All of this we do not give them:

c. End of sending a soldier on two consecutive overseas assignments, unless requested by the soldier.

Believe me, this is not the exception; this is the rule. I have any number of

complaints coming into my office, as a Senator and as a member of the Committee on Armed Services, about men who have just gone through Vietnam and have been shipped to Germany, with no opportunity to see their families for any extended period of time, unless they pay the bill to take their families to Europe. How unfair can we get?

d. Unless all military families have their incomes raised above the poverty level, Federal Food Stamps and other financial welfare services should be provided to the military families in Europe.

e. Make changes in civilian jobs with the U.S. military in Europe so that all jobs possible will be given to American dependents instead of Europeans.

This study is the personal work and opinion of the undersigned and does not represent the views of the U.S. Army, Europe.

Most assuredly, it does not. It is signed by Capt. Fletcher Hamilton, Medical Service Corps, and Steven S. Sinning, major and psychiatrist with the Medical Corps.

This brings me to one more point. Since uncovering the memorandum I brought out a few days ago and read again today, whereby the commanding general of the European exchange system, General Phipps, had recommended that only local nationals be considered for these jobs, the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Roger Kelley, has personally taken over the investigation of this matter. He has assured me that they are going to rectify that particular memorandum, that that memorandum will from now on correspond to the alleged policy that has been operating over there for some time, of giving American nationals some preference. Senators may rest assured that I will follow up and make sure that is done, because I think this is the greatest injustice of all.

I have in my hand a copy of the latest memorandum, which has gone out as a result of my bringing these facts out in committee just a few weeks ago. We hope this will begin to straighten out the mess and the terrible way in which we are treating GI's. It is a memorandum that has gone out to Germany and to European forces:

A. HQ EES Management Information Letter N. 30, February 1971, as amended by EES commanders Newsletter No. 37, April 1971.

1. This is a joint DA/DAF Message.

2. Department of Defense Policy announced 6 March 1961 requires that nonappropriated fund activities in foreign countries make maximum utilization of US dependents already in country and enlisted personnel employed during off-duty hours, in lieu of local foreign nationals. This policy remains in effect.

3. Referenced documents should be amended and other pertinent command instructions reviewed to insure continuing compliance with policy cited in Para 1, above.

4. You should anticipate additional instructions on this subject in the near future.

While this, according to the books of the Defense Department here, allegedly has been the policy since March of 1961, it obviously has not been. The policy has been followed more in the breaking of it than in the observance of it. Had it not been for Captain Hamilton and his leadership there, I doubt that we still would know that the Commanding General of Europe has sent out a policy totally con-

tradicting what the alleged policy of this Government supposedly has been since March of 1961. I do believe that Assistant Secretary Kelley is going to see that this mess is cleaned up. I commend him for his efforts.

I am sorry that it took all this trouble to do what our GI's are entitled to do in the first place. This, itself, tells us what we are doing wrong in Europe—the fact that we have to debate a situation such as this and have to consider it—the fact that I had to offer an amendment in committee, which was accepted by the chairman—and I commend the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services for accepting my amendment.

My amendment reads:

At the end of the bill add a new section as follows:

SEC. 15. Unless prohibited by treaty, no person shall be discriminated against by the Department of Defense or by any officer or employee thereof, in the employment of civilian personnel at any facility or installation operated by the Department of Defense in any foreign country because such person is a citizen of the United States or is a dependent of a member of the Armed Forces of the United States. As used in this section, the term facility or installation operated by the Department of Defense shall include any officers' club, non-commissioned club, post exchange, or commissary store.

I think it pretty well tells the story to know that a U.S. Senator has to write into a bill an amendment that says we will not discriminate against our GI's and our exchange bases with our pay or with servicemen's facilities. It is a pretty sad day in American history when a Senator has to present an amendment like that.

I commend the chairman for his willingness to tackle the problem and get it straightened out. To me, this shows the whole problem of why we had seriously to debate the NATO question, why we wonder about the cost of paying the bill there, and why we are facing up to the situation there. The debate was healthy and long overdue. It is another aspect of what has been happening.

It is our own GI's that are the guinea pigs. It is our own GI's who are, in fact, being discriminated against. It is our own GI's that a Senator has to write an amendment to protect so that they will not be discriminated against.

That pretty well sums up the case why we have to start to treat our GI's as citizens of the United States and give them the same kind of pay, the same kind of consideration, the same kind of emolument, the same kind of service and respect that all other people in our American society get today.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, today I have joined in cosponsoring the Schweiker-Hughes amendments to the draft bill currently before the Senate.

The first of these amendments will provide for a 1-year extension of the draft, rather than the 2-year term requested by the administration and recommended by the Senate Armed Services Committee.

A 1-year extension will require the Congress to consider this issue next year and to exercise the responsibility which

Development of the U.S. SALT policy is cited by Administration officials as a model of how the NSC system is supposed to work. Because of the sensitive nature of the SALT talks, which are secret, few of those involved in the planning—past or present—would speak on the record in *National Journal* interviews. But, several talked on a not-for-attribution basis.

**Stakes:** A comprehensive arms-control agreement, limiting both offensive and defensive weapons, would sharply reduce pressure for spending on several major strategic weapons programs under development by the Pentagon.

**Defensive**—But the limited proposals being discussed at SALT thus far would curtail only the Safeguard antiballistic system (ABM) among U.S. programs. The Administration has begun deployment of Safeguard, which has an estimated cost of \$11.9 billion.

The United States has offered to halt deployment of Safeguard, provided that any SALT agreement covers both offensive weapons and ABMs. The goal is a limit on the Soviets' powerful SS-9 missile, which can carry up to 18 warheads.

In line with its stated desire to go slow on ABM because of the negotiations, the Administration requested only \$1.3 billion—a relatively small amount—for Safeguard in the fiscal 1972 budget.

**Offensive**—In the past year, the Administration also began deploying two major missile systems, the sea-based Poseidon and land-based Minuteman III, both having the controversial qualitative improvement known as MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle).

The military services and their allies in Congress have resisted demands for arms-control advocates that deployment of MIRV warheads be stopped to avoid possible adverse effects at SALT.

The Administration also has begun work on two additional strategic systems, the B-1 bomber and ULMS, a submarine missile system. First described as hedges against the possible failure of SALT, the two systems are now defended by the Pentagon simply as replacements.

No SALT agreement has been considered that would preclude deployment of B-1 or ULMS. Both are now in the research-and-development stage and would be enormously expensive to procure in large numbers. The B-1 bomber program has an estimated price tag of \$9.8 billion. The Pentagon has given no firm estimate of ULMS' ultimate cost.

**Over-all scope**—*National Journal* determined in January that nearly \$68 billion remains to be appropriated for 52 major weapons systems, strategic and tactical, in various phases of development. About 100 other systems, also being planned, could add billions in development and procurement costs. (For cost figures on the 52 systems, see No. 4, p. 170.)

#### NSC SYSTEM

The White House holds tight control over U.S. participation in the SALT talks.

The NSC staff under Kissinger sits at the center of a complex interdepartmental committee system through which all preliminary analysis for SALT was coordinated. The day-to-day monitoring of the talks is closely tied to the NSC system. Changes in the basic, prearranged U.S. positions are cleared through the same structure.

In other areas bearing directly on strategic arms policy, the committee system has responsibilities for:

Review and articulation of broad policy, in documents like the President's Feb. 25 foreign policy message to Congress;

Review of Pentagon weapons plans and development of broad policy directives to guide Pentagon force planning;

Assessment of the Soviet threat.

The membership of the various committees, generally at the under secretary or assistant secretary level, includes considerable overlap among officials from the Defense Department, State Department, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Central Intelligence Agency.

To a large extent, the committees consist of the same officials wearing different hats. Structure: President Nixon moved early to revive the National Security Council as the formal mechanism for high-level review of issues requiring Presidential decision.

The NSC is composed nominally of the President and his Cabinet, with other policymaking officials sitting in when invited.

The council functions as a court of final appeal on military policy issues involving substantial disagreement within the government.

The distinctive feature of the NSC system under Mr. Nixon is the strong, independent role of the large NSC staff assembled for the President by Kissinger. The 110-member staff is the focal point for a multilevel structure of interagency committees and working groups reaching deep into the national security bureaucracy.

The committees are chaired by Kissinger or other NSC staff members and composed of a shifting cast of officials from the departments and agencies concerned. These groups meet at irregular intervals to review the work of lower-level working groups and staff analysts drawn from throughout the government.

**Verification Panel**—The focal point of NSC control over the U.S. position is the Verification Panel, which served as the central interdepartmental forum during the extended period while U.S. SALT positions were being worked out. The panel focused its analyses on how to verify Soviet compliance with an arms-control agreement and what dangers might come from Soviet cheating.

It continues to serve as the forum for preparing summary analyses of the pros and cons of possible shifts in the basic U.S. bargaining position.

The panel is chaired by Kissinger. Its meetings are usually attended by Gerard C. Smith, ACDA director and chief U.S. negotiator at SALT; David Packard, deputy secretary of defense; John N. Mitchell, Attorney General; John N. Irwin II, under secretary of state; Richard Helms, Central Intelligence Agency director (or Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr., deputy CIA director); and Maj. Gen. Royal B. Allison, Joint Chiefs of Staff officer for SALT and a member of the U.S. negotiating team.

**Working group**—Below the panel is the Verification Panel Working Group, which monitors the specific detailed analyses asked for by the panel, delineates the conflicting agency positions where they exist, prepares the initial summaries of the Verification Panel and assigns specific analytical tasks to staff analysts, or to special study groups and government offices with special expertise.

The chairman of the Verification Panel Working Group is K. Wayne Smith, Kissinger's chief deputy for analysis and former special assistant to Alain C. Enthoven, assistant secretary of defense for systems analysis under former Defense Secretary (1961-68) Robert S. McNamara (For a report on the Systems Analysis Office, see Vol. 2, No. 49, p. 2643.)

The Verification Panel Working Group is composed of the designated representatives of panel members (except Mitchell). The group's current members are Gardiner L. Tucker, assistant secretary of defense for systems analysis; Spurgeon M. Keeny Jr., ACDA assistant director for science and technology; Ronald I. Spiers, director of the State Department Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs; Gen. Marvin C. Demler, Joint Chiefs of Staff special assistant for arms control,

and a CIA representative assigned on a rotating basis.

The Verification Panel Working Group often breaks down into ad hoc sessions during the development of an analytical effort, with the formal members frequently represented by designated subordinates, who can work full time on SALT problems. Tucker's special assistant for SALT, Archie Wood, and Col. Paul R. Von Ins, Gen. Allison's staff assistant, often sit in when their superiors cannot be present.

The detailed analyses of strategic weapons issues and SALT strategy and the written summaries of agency views are prepared initially by staff assistants of working group members or are farmed out to specialists in the various agencies, in particular the office of the director of Defense Department research and engineering, ACDA and the CIA.

Where the work is done and the level at which interagency coordination begins vary widely. Some basic policy papers are written by the NSC staff, while detailed technical assessments originate with the scientific staffs of the departments and agencies concerned.

Detailed analytical work on SALT issues is coordinated by Col. Jack Merritt, Wayne Smith's principal deputy on the NSC staff.

**"Backstopping committee"**—Day-to-day liaison with the negotiating team, clearing instructions to the delegation and deciding negotiating tactics, is handled by a so-called SALT "backstopping committee." Philip J. Farley, ACDA deputy director, is chairman, with Keeny acting as chairman in Farley's absence. Membership on the committee is basically the same as for the Verification Panel Working Group and includes Tucker, Demler and Spiers. The NSC is represented by Helmut Sonnenfeldt, senior staff member and an expert in Soviet affairs.

Much of the routine business of supporting the U.S. delegation at the talks is handled without formal meetings.

On occasions when developments at the talks raise the question of a basic change in policy, the issue is sent to the Verification Panel—and ultimately to the President—for decision.

**Negotiating team**—The U.S. negotiating team at SALT is headed by Smith. Other members are Paul H. Nitze, former deputy defense secretary (1967-69); Harold Brown, former director of defense research and engineering (1961-65) and Secretary of the Air Force (1965-69); J. Graham Parsons, deputy for SALT in the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, and Allison.

**DPRC:** Weapons systems and force requirements, which could have a bearing on the bargaining at SALT, are reviewed at a high interdepartmental level by the Defense Program Review Committee, a major component of the NSC structure.

**Roles, composition**—The DPRC, also chaired by Kissinger, is composed essentially of the same officials, at the under secretary level, who sit on the Verification Panel.

The WPRC is the forum for integrating Pentagon weapons plans into the Administration's broad policy objectives including arms control efforts, and for relating the whole to the federal budget.

The DPRC serves the dual purpose of integrating high-level NSC review of the Defense Department budgetary process and of bringing Joint Chiefs of Staff officers directly into the process. The Joint Chiefs are represented at all levels of DPRC reviews and analysis. (For more on the defense budget system, including the DPRC's role, see Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 9; Vol. 2, No. 49, p. 2642; and Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 166.)

**NSC analysis**—The DPRC was organized late in 1969 in an effort to see that NSC guidance on Pentagon programs had the kind of detailed analytical base that SALT policy was afforded by the Verification Panel structure.



The DPRC was set up as a multilevel committee system similar to that of the Verification Panel. It includes several of the same people, with Wayne Smith coordinating the detailed analyses for NSC.

**Intelligence:** Most discussion about possible SALT agreements and, in theory at least, the rationales for U.S. weapons systems, derive from intelligence about the Soviets and other potential enemies.

Richard Helms is chief intelligence advisor to the President, by statute, and the CIA, which he heads, has primary responsibility for evaluation of intelligence.

CIA officials and analysts sit as members of all the NSC committees and study groups. But evaluation of the evidence is an inexact science often colored by the differing missions of the agencies using intelligence. Fundamental to disagreements over policy and program rationales among the intelligence agencies are their differing evaluations of the threat.

**USIB**—In addition to the CIA, all other departments and agencies involved in national security affairs have some intelligence evaluation capability. An effort to reach a working consensus on what constitutes the basic threat is made through the U.S. Intelligence Board, chaired by Helms.

Other members of the USIB are Howard C. Brown Jr., assistant general manager, Atomic Energy Commission; Ray S. Cline, director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research; Lt. Gen. Cushman, deputy director of CIA; Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, director of the National Security Agency; and William C. Sullivan, deputy director of FBI.

USIB is charged with overseeing and coordinating the exchange of intelligence within the government, assigning intelligence gathering tasks, working out general priorities on collection of intelligence and supervising the preparation of National Intelligence Estimates.

**Collection**—Basic intelligence on strategic weapons comes from several sources.

The Air Force's National Reconnaissance Officer spends about \$1 billion a year, principally on satellites that photograph in great detail designated areas of the Soviet Union and China.

This and other reconnaissance gives a fairly accurate count of missile silos (old or under construction), activities in Soviet naval shipyards and many other military activities.

**Technical intelligence** about the capabilities of Soviet strategic weapons is derived from a number of other sources including technical and military journals, reports about accomplishments of the Soviet space program, seismological monitoring of nuclear warhead tests, radar and visual monitoring of missile tests and analysis of the external configuration of weapons seen on parade or in photographs.

Between \$5 billion and \$6 billion is spent every year by the various agencies on the collection and evaluation of intelligence.

The AEC has primary responsibility for information about Soviet nuclear testing.

The National Security Agency, which employs over 90,000 persons, many of them military personnel from the security branches of the three services, spends nearly \$1 billion annually monitoring radio transmissions and radar emissions around the world.

In addition, the CIA, State Department and the military intelligence operations bring together vast amounts of political intelligence from open and covert sources, including spies, defectors, foreign publications and statements by officials.

**Threat assessment:** According to NSC officials, all departments and agencies directly concerned with strategic weapons and policy have the technical expertise to evaluate the basic technical intelligence.

**CIA**—Although the CIA evaluates intelligence, it scrupulously avoids making policy recommendations.

Helms told the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 14 that the CIA "can not and must not take sides." If he were to advocate a particular position, he said, those recommending another position would suspect "that the intelligence presentation has been stacked to support my position, and the credibility of CIA goes out the window."

**DIA**—Defense Intelligence Agency analysts coordinate work done directly for NSC through Col. John V. McLain, DIA special assistant for NSC matters.

**ACDA**—Technical analysis for ACDA, which does not collect intelligence and which does not participate directly in the USIB process, is carried out primarily in the Science and Technology Bureau, headed by Keeny. Before going to ACDA in March 1969, Keeny worked on strategic weapons issues at the CIA and then as a member of the NSC staff. His deputy, Sidney N. Graybeal, was a strategic weapons analyst at CIA.

**State Department**—State Department analysis of strategic weapons intelligence is centered in the office of Strategic and General Research of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which has a direct role in the USIB process. The office is headed by Frank H. Perez.

Both Keeny and Perez played vigorous roles in the length process of analysis that went into the U.S. position at SALT.

**Director of Defense Research and Engineering**—A particularly influential role in evaluating strategic intelligence and projecting the long-range threat is played by the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, headed since 1965 by John S. Foster Jr.

Foster is the principal technical adviser to Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird. Foster's office has control over the military services' research and development money, reviews the services' research-and-development budget requests each year for Laird, and is the focal point in assessing the progress of weapons research and development programs under way.

According to Foster's chief deputy, Eberhard Rechlin the principal responsibility of the office is to guide the long-range direction of U.S. weapons programs and ensure that U.S. research and development programs are undertaken that will avoid a "military Sputnik" some time in the future.

"Our main worry is that the roof will fall in during the 1974-78 time period," Rechlin said in an interview.

Foster's office developed a strong independent threat-assessment capability and Foster has assumed a principal role in preparing the rationales for major research and development programs based on that capability.

The de facto role played by Foster's office in threat assessment has been formalized by Laird with the recent creation of a "net technical assessment group" within the Pentagon headed by Foster and assigned the responsibility of making detailed evaluations of Soviet weapons.

**"Model system":** Several top NSC officials said that the interdepartmental structure put together by Kissinger, in particular the Verification Panel, is, as one official put it, "a model process for analyzing issues for the President and putting everything on a firm, factual basis."

"It's important to emphasize that it is an analytical process, not a decision-making process," this official said. "We aren't hashing out a final consensus to present to the President for ratification, the way the system operated under Eisenhower."

#### CENTRALIZATION

On paper, the NSC committee system gathers the reins of power into the White House, with every issue and analysis rising

through levels of synthesis, passing through Kissinger's hands and arriving on the President's desk as a clear set of options with the arguments for and against fully spelled out.

But NSC officials are quick to place their role in perspective.

Rather than subordinating the traditional departments and agencies, they say, the system ensures that conflicting agency positions are clearly laid out for the President and are not lost in a compromise negotiated at lower levels.

The NSC interdepartmental system has been clearly predominant in the articulation of broad policy goals in documents such as the President's foreign policy message. It has also dominated the Administration's SALT policies, but it has had a much less central role in decisions on U.S. strategic weapons programs.

**NSC role:** Administration officials questioned by *National Journal* generally agreed that centralizing SALT policy analysis in the NSC system has worked out well.

**Views represented**—According to NSC officials, the interdepartmental committees, such as the Verification Panel, are organized to ensure that views of the departments involved are fairly represented.

"The President has to know what his top advisers think," one NSC staff member said.

The major agencies in strategic weapons deliberations—ACDA, CIA and the Defense Department—are represented at all levels by officials with enough rank and staff resources to strongly represent their agency interests.

Kissinger's staff plays an important role in pointing the direction of analysis—by posing questions, challenging agency positions and structuring the summaries presented to the Verification Panel or other high-level groups. The NSC staff also has the primary role in writing the Administration's policy statements after decisions are made.

"If you have ever read any of Kissinger's books, you know who was behind the President's foreign policy message," one former Pentagon official said.

But, one NSC staff member said, "The system doesn't give anybody a veto, during the preliminary work or later. The top people can question anything that goes on and can back out of anything the lower-level people might have agreed to."

One high official said, "We don't have any illusions about standing astride the access to the President. The top people can and do make their views fully known in NSC meetings and the NSC system isn't the only channel open to the President."

**Function**—The NSC official said, however, that Kissinger and his staff "are not exactly intellectual eunuchs, mechanically balancing other people's arguments."

"Henry is the President's foreign policy adviser and he gives advice. So do a lot of other people," he said.

The kinds of analyses that are done, the way the choices are presented to the President and the NSC and the shape of the resulting policies inevitably reflect the biases of the President and his leading officials, such as Kissinger.

"Obviously, there's no such thing as pure analysis," one top NSC official said. "The cliché is 'the assumptions drive the analysis,' but the point of the kind of analysis the NSC has done is to make sure the assumptions are explicit, spelled out, understood."

**SALT example**—The detailed and protracted analyses that went into preparation of the U.S. positions at SALT are regarded by the officials involved as an example of the NSC system at its best.

Administration officials interviewed by *National Journal* agree that the Verification Panel system under Kissinger has dealt fairly with all sides in its analysis and summaries of issues for the President.

"Everyone had his day in court at every stage in the process," an ACDA official said.



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"By trying to ensure that conflicting views were clearly represented, the system protected against things being forced into a simple-minded consensus."

A full hearing for ACDA in the highest policy councils has not meant that eventual U.S. policies have reflected ACDA's position on major SALT issues. As an example, the basic disagreement between ACDA and the Pentagon over whether a ban on MIRVs can be adequately monitored to prevent cheating, has been resolved on a number of occasions in favor of the Pentagon view that no MIRV ban is feasible.

Despite these occasional setbacks, another ACDA official said, "the system gives agencies like ACDA a full-fledged role in formulation of military policy, instead of treating them as appendages off to one side."

He added that the interdepartmental discussions have had an educational benefit.

"The fear of the unknown that generally makes top officials suspicious of arms control has been reduced. Just knowing what the technical pros and cons are may supply the confidence in the arms control approach that will be needed among high-level officials to get an agreement."

**Differences:** The Pentagon holds the edge when technical disagreements arise over current Soviet capabilities, the time frame for future Soviet technological advances, the technical problems of verification and other issues.

Here the relative technical analysis capabilities of the agencies involved in SALT policy come into play.

**Resources:** Officials involved in the analysis process acknowledge that the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff have "almost limitless resources to call on," as one NSC staff member described it.

"They have the technical manpower and some very influential people," he said, "and, of course they have a lot bigger constituency than the other agencies, but this is all recognized. The important point is that it really doesn't do them that much good if their arguments are bad."

NSC officials describe the ACDA technical staff as small but very capable. An ACDA official emphasized that they were under no constraints in making their views known.

The total ACDA budget of \$10 million is less than the cost of one of the new F-15 fighters emerging from the Pentagon research and development mill. But ACDA officials emphasize that they have no inferiority complex in evaluation of technical intelligence or other technical assessment issues.

**Estimates:** The National Intelligence Estimates prepared by the U.S. Intelligence Board are intended to be an agreed-upon summary of the range of possible future developments in Soviet weapons.

The estimates are seldom the last word for U.S. weapons planning or the development of rationales for those weapons.

The format of the estimates ("If the Soviets do this, then they may have x capability within y number of years") leaves a lot of room for interpretation. In addition, there is provision for carrying through disagreements over specific estimates in the form of footnotes.

**Institutional biases:** The different missions and perspectives of the offices contributing to threat assessment lead to differences in emphasis on what factors to emphasize in policy planning.

"Of course there are biases in threat projections, but they are well understood," one NSC official said, "Part of our job is to make sure all the positions are represented."

An ACDA official said, "Johnny Foster's office has responsibility for developing U.S. weapons technology and a reasonable case can be made for his insistence that he has to assume the worst possible, realistically possible, threat for planning purposes."

"We have different responsibilities and we

tend to emphasize the improbability of the worst possible case."

The CIA, as the principal official evaluation agency, often is caught in the middle. Helms was called to appear in secret session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April 1969, when committee members expressed skepticism about intelligence used by Laird in defending the Safeguard ABM and about Laird's claim that the Soviet missile deployments proved they were "going for a first strike," a claim not based on any agreed USIB assessment.

More recently, Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., disclosed the discovery in satellite photographs of Soviet missile silos, which he said were larger than those normally associated with the largest Soviet ICBM, the SS-9.

Laird said in a New York speech April 21 that the new silos signal a whole new generation of giant missiles for the Soviets and that this "must be of major concern . . ." He said the United States might be forced to take unspecified "additional offsetting actions" to balance the Soviet activity, if the SALT talks fail to produce an agreement.

**ACDA low profile:**—The high visibility of these and similar interpretations of the Soviet threat has led, according to ACDA officials, to private criticisms from arms-control advocates that ACDA should be doing more to publicize alternative viewpoints.

A top ACDA-SALT official told *National Journal* that Smith, Farley and the other ACDA participants in the SALT process decided in the beginning to try to influence Administration policy from the inside, without attempting to make their views public through friendly Members of Congress, the academic community or leaks to the press.

"The country has a military policy. Our role is to try to influence that policy," he said. "It was decided in the beginning that the quickest way to lose credibility and kill our effectiveness was to get involved in trying to build up outside pressure."

#### OUTSIDE ADVISERS

Strategic weapons policy is influenced from outside the government by a diffuse array of advisory committees, contract research organizations, academic consultants and scientific advisers.

Many of the current precepts guiding strategic weapons analysis and doctrine may be traced back through 20 years of academic theorizing and technological change.

**Advisory committees:** The President is advised on aspects of strategic weapons policy by a number of high-level committees of outside experts.

**FIAB:**—The Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is charged with reviewing operations of the entire U.S. intelligence community and suggesting ways to improve the collection and coordination of intelligence activities. The board is composed of nine leading businessmen and former government officials, including Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller, R-N.Y.; Frank Pace Jr., former Secretary of the Army (1950-53) and retired chairman of General Dynamics Corp.; Edwin H. Land, founder of Polaroid Corp. The current chairman is retired Adm. George W. Anderson Jr., former Chief of Naval Operations (1961-63). The board has been given a formal role in the annual review of the Safeguard ABM program.

**Scientists:**—A special panel on strategic weapons of the President's Science Advisory Committee reviews specific weapons research, when asked, and offers the President its opinion on whether they seem worthwhile. The Science Advisory Committee is headed by the director of the Office of Science and Technology, currently Edward E. David Jr., former scientist for Bell Telephone Laboratories. The committee's special strategic weapons panel was disbanded in August 1970, with the resignation of Lee A. Du-

Bridge as OST director. David has not yet named a new panel.

The former strategic weapons panel was headed by Sidney D. Drell, assistant director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University. Drell criticized the Administration's Safeguard ABM plans in congressional testimony last year.

**ACDA committee:**—The General Advisory Committee for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is composed of a blue-ribbon list of former government officials, including former Secretary of State (1961-69) Dean Rusk; John J. McCloy, former Military Governor for Germany (1949-52), former president of the World Bank (1947-49) and arms control advisor to President Kennedy; Cyrus R. Vance, former Deputy Secretary of Defense (1964-67), Secretary of the Army (1962-64) and deputy chief negotiator at the Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam (1968-69); and William C. Foster, first director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1961-69).

The group proposed in March 1970 that the President seek at SALT freeze by both sides on the deployment of new weapons, including MIRV and improved surface-to-air missiles.

On several occasions the group has advised the President that the United States should abandon its insistence that a MIRV ban requires on-site inspection and should seek an agreement halting testing and production of MIRV systems.

Committee members have taken an increasingly active role in public criticism of Administration SALT policy. One member, Foster, has been advocating publicly in recent months a total ban on nuclear weapons testing, a complete ban on ABM deployment, production and testing and a ban on MIRV testing.

None of these suggestions has been accepted.

**Pentagon advisers:** Each of the military services supports a scientific advisory board of defense-oriented scientists to advise on weapons research and development.

**Science board:**—In addition, the Defense Science Board, currently headed by Gerald F. Tape, performs in advisory function for the Secretary of Defense and the director of defense research and engineering.

Tape is an academic physicist and former Atomic Energy Commissioner (1963-69).

The board has had a continuing role in reviewing the Safeguard program and has been asked for opinions on a number of other programs currently under development, including the Army's Hardsite ABM concept, to which the board gave high priority in a 1969 review.

**Consultants:**—Countless academic scientists and industry researchers and engineers consult on a full- or part-time basis with offices throughout the Pentagon. In addition, the Pentagon and the services support a long list of contract research organizations for both policy analysis and technical research and development.

The most prominent of these is the Rand Corp. of Santa Monica, Calif. Former Rand associates are scattered throughout the government and the academic community. Richard Litter, a long-time Pentagon consultant from Rand, a member of the Defense Science Board and a principal figure in developing the Safeguard ABM, is serving as a technical adviser to the U.S. delegation at SALT.

**O'Neill panel:**—The efforts of a group of scientists, called together by John Foster to review the Safeguard plans in fiscal 1971, offer an example of the role those advisory groups play in strategic weapons policy.

The panel of seven scientists, called the Ad Hoc Group on Safeguard, was headed by Lawrence H. O'Neill, president of the Riverside Research Institute in New York and a professor at Columbia University. The panel

was selected by Foster to include scientists who favor and scientists who oppose Safeguard.

Foster asked the group only to comment on the technical capability of Safeguard to meet the Soviet threat as projected. It was asked specifically not to consider strategic, political or diplomatic factors.

After three days of Pentagon meetings, the panel reported it felt Safeguard was adequate for the "thin" area defense missions in its rationale, but that if the primary mission were to protect Minuteman, the Pentagon should move ahead quickly on the Hardsite concept.

This qualified endorsement was later cited by Foster in congressional hearings as endorsement that the Safeguard system could "do the job the Pentagon wanted it to do." The assertion led Sen. J. W. Fulbright, D-Ark., Foreign Relations Committee chairman, to charge that the panel's conclusions had been distorted to provide "window dressing" for Safeguard.

The charge of window dressing was also raised about the President's Advisory Committee on Strategic Weapons, which passed on the Safeguard plan after a meeting with Foster March 17, 1969, three days after Mr. Nixon announced his ABM decision. Defense intellectuals: Kissinger came to prominence in the closed world of the so-called "defense intellectuals," academic theorists whose influence has been immense on the rationales behind deterrence strategies, if not on the actual course of weapons development.

Among the most prominent of these theorists and writers on weapons strategy are Thomas C. Schelling, a Harvard professor; Herman Kahn, director of the Hudson Institute; Albert Wohlstetter, professor at the University of Chicago; and Donald G. Brennan, Hudson Institute staff member. They consult regularly with Pentagon and other government officials and testify frequently before congressional committees.

Kissinger himself wrote prolifically on strategic weapons issues and NATO policy while a Harvard professor and served as consultant, at various times since the late 1950s, to the Pentagon and ACDA, and to the National Security Council during the Johnson Administration.

#### CRITICISM

The Administration's machinery for producing national security policy is not universally admired.

A former high-level scientific adviser to the Pentagon, who asked not to be named, said in an interview:

"The most important thing is whether the system really confronts its own biases and produces truly objective assessments of the relative risks involved between a something-less-than-foolproof arms-control agreement and a continuation of the arms race into a new era of particularly threatening and costly technology.

"I don't think the NSC debates have done this; but even worse, a lot of dubious military hardware is being justified in the name of arms control—bargaining chips, as they're called—and the public has been softened up for blaming it on the Russians if the talks fail."

**ABM villain:** A number of the Administration's critics point to the decision to deploy the Safeguard ABM as a principal source of subsequent inhibitions on U.S. SALT policy.

The Nixon Administration inherited an ABM program, the Sentinel, when it came into office, as well as a rising groundswell of opposition in Congress and the scientific community to the ABM concept. It was also faced with Army proposals for expanding Sentinel.

**Stone—**Jeremy J. Stone, head of the Washington office of the Federation of American Scientists, said that the Administration decision to go ahead with its revised version

of Sentinel, renamed Safeguard, has vastly complicated all subsequent thinking on arms control and strategic weapons.

Stone said the Safeguard ABM concept has been very costly politically because its rationales emphasized the vulnerability of Minuteman missiles. The Administration was emphasizing the vulnerability of one weapon, Minuteman, to help sell Congress on the idea of another, Safeguard, he said.

**Scoville—**The projections of the threat to Minuteman that the Soviets could be capable of posing by the mid-1970s, which are the basis for Safeguard deployment, have been central to most subsequent SALT analysis, in the view of Herbert Scoville Jr., a leading critic of Administration strategic weapons policy and a former assistant director for science and technology for ACDA. Scoville left ACDA in the early months of the Nixon Administration.

Scoville said that many of the arguments offered by the Administration in explanation of strategic weapons policies are familiar to long-time participants in strategic weapons debates and represent the "predominance of Johnny Foster's shop."

**Blitz:** Scoville said that Foster and other weapons experts viewing strategic weapons "as essentially a series of technical problems to be solved" prevailed in the early months of the Administration debates because they used strong and imaginative projections of weapons advances the Soviets are technically capable of making.

These projections of a possible Soviet threat were derived in part from new intelligence about Soviet SS-9 deployments and multiple warhead testing.

According to Scoville, "The basic problem with new intelligence is that it is easy to have differing points of view about what it implies. One can construct quite plausible, highly technical interpretations and, even inadvertently, overwhelm people for whom the intelligence and the arguments are somewhat new."

Scoville thinks that technical assessments are getting a much more skeptical look in Administration debates now.

**Effects:** One former ACDA official says that the assigned role of the Verification Panel and the pressures that led to its formation—dissatisfaction with the earlier treatment of verification problems and the possible dangers from Soviet cheating—have served to reinforce the technological, "worst case" approach to strategic arms problems at the expense of other, softer arguments.

"On the one side there is given a strong, not totally unrealistic technical argument emphasizing what they (the Soviets) could do if they wanted. On the other is the argument, perhaps in equally technical terms, which says, 'well, maybe it is possible, but it is highly improbable,'" he said. "The current system seems to me to favor the first way of thinking."

NSC officials say that projections of what the Soviets are technically capable of doing within a given time frame have to be the primary basis for prudent policy making.

The President's Feb. 25 foreign policy message says the existing military balance "does not permit us to judge the significance of Soviet actions only by what they say—or even what we believe—are their intentions. We must measure their actions, at least in part, against their capabilities."

**Yardstick—**The principal measuring rod for interpreting intelligence about Soviet weapons is what is known, for example, about missile accuracy or silo hardness, from U.S. experience.

This is the argument frequently used by Foster and other Pentagon officials to bolster their case for continued heavy expenditures in weapons research and development.

**Rebuttal—**Scoville and others, including Herbert York, former director of defense research and engineering (1958-61), and self-

described longtime "participant in the arms race" now turned opponent of Safeguard, say that measuring Soviet capability by U.S. experience can create a self-contained action-reaction cycle within U.S. weapons development, which may bear only indirectly on actual Soviet progress and contributes to a self-generated arms race.

One former top Pentagon analyst notes that the NSC interdepartmental committee system "probably serves the President well to the extent that it makes sure that everyone is arguing about the same things."

"But in strategic issues, it's very dangerous if the interdepartmental coordination serves to give all arguments a kind of artificial equality," he adds.

"This is particularly important in arms control issues because some of the crucial variables are not really susceptible to qualitative analysis or even perhaps to fully articulate expression on paper.

Scoville says that this is a basic danger deriving from the rise of "worst case" technical analysis to the position of primacy in arms-control policy making.

"What's needed is a President with the inclination to challenge all the technical gobbledegook and say 'Well, why is that important?'" Scoville said. Limited options: Several factors have joined, in the view of some critics of Administration policies, to produce an overly cautious, limited view of the choices available on strategic weapons questions.

One former Pentagon systems analyst says that the original ABM decision was made on the basis of options and arguments that really left little choice.

The inherited Sentinel system was already well along, with production engineering already under way and 7,300 employees of prime and first level subcontractors already working. In addition, nearly \$6 billion had already been spent since 1958 on developing ABM technology and the Army was wholly committed. These factors and the strong arguments demonstrating the potential Soviet threat made killing ABM an unlikely choice.

The choice of expanding Sentinel was challenged as a destabilizing move in the strategic weapons balance and as being too expensive.

Support of the basic Safeguard concept, primarily the work of Foster, was widespread.

Other ABM concepts, such as the Hardsite concept of strong silo defenses, were not offered as short-range options.

The President's foreign policy message, in discussing the broad alternatives studied for NATO deterrence, presents a similar limited set of choices: "reliance on conventional forces alone; early response with nuclear weapons; a flexible strategy that does not preclude or force either kind of response."

The Pentagon and the NSC analysis structure have been directed to study the means of implementing the third choice.

**Choices known:** NSC officials say that the system serves the President well. They emphasize that the President has a strong personal interest in strategic weapons issues.

"The President gets detailed papers on these issues," one NSC staff member said. "None of those one-page summaries you hear about in other areas."

One ACDA official said that Kissinger is a "powerful source of continuity in arms control debates" and that he has placed particular emphasis on having all sides fairly represented.

A former NSC staff member who participated in the SALT preparation process told *National Journal*, "If it turns out that the Administration is not taking the right approach to SALT, it won't be because alternative courses weren't known."

#### KISSINGER: MASTER STRATEGIST

Henry A. Kissinger, 47, assistant to the President for national security affairs, is a

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powerful and controversial figure in the Nixon Administration.

Many in Congress, the press and the public believe—rightly or wrongly—that he and his staff wield more influence in the making of foreign policy than the State Department or the Pentagon.

Klissinger's role has been criticized because his power is not balanced by accountability to congressional committees. He has been the key figure in the Administration's revival of the National Security Council.

**Academic background:** Klissinger established himself academically by elaborating a refinement of the balance-of-power approach to diplomacy. In 1957 he criticized the "massive retaliation" doctrine of the Eisenhower Administration, and argued instead for developing a flexible capability to fight limited nuclear or conventional wars.

Klissinger taught at Harvard University from the time he received his doctorate in 1954 until December 1968 when he was designated as Mr. Nixon's national security adviser. (In January 1971 he resigned from the Harvard faculty to remain at the White House.)

**Consultant:** While at Harvard, he held advisory positions in the foreign policy establishment, including posts with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1956-60), and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1961-68). He advised Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson in a personal capacity. He also directed foreign policy studies for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the Council on Foreign Relations. He was foreign policy adviser to Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller of New York during his unsuccessful campaign for the Republican Presidential nomination in 1968.

Klissinger is the author of three books on U.S. foreign policy and defense strategy.

#### NIXON GOALS: STRENGTH AND STABILITY

President Nixon spelled out the Administration's approach to strategic forces planning in his Feb. 25 foreign policy message.

Mr. Nixon said that while he is committed to keeping strategic forces strong, "I am equally committed to seeking a stable strategic relationship with the Soviet Union through negotiations."

He added: "There is no inconsistency between these goals; they are in fact complementary."

**World view:** The President's message repeatedly reaffirms the U.S. commitment to act as peacekeeper in a world where the United States and the Soviet Union, as the two most powerful nations, "conduct global policies that bring their interests into contention across a broad range of issues."

**Linkage:** The President emphasized in a number of contexts that the basic aim of U.S. policy is to demonstrate to the Soviets that they should not be tempted into "bolder challenges" as their strategic power approaches parity with that of the United States.

The President cited the Soviet Union's policy in the Middle East and its naval exercises in the Caribbean as examples of policies and actions that, in his view, may stem from a Soviet "failure to appreciate the risks and consequences of probing for advantages or testing the limits of toleration."

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, carried this argument a step further in March 10 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee.

"We will pay a very high price in the effectiveness of our diplomacy if we permit the Soviet Union to achieve a clearly evident strategic superiority, even were that superiority to have no practical effect on the outcome of an all-out nuclear exchange," Moorer said.

**Carrot and stick:** In the President's estimate, U.S. and Soviet strategic forces have

reached a level of rough parity that affords a basis for structuring a stable balance of power between the two superpowers.

The President's message held out the promise of accommodation through SALT and other negotiations—on Berlin, force reductions in Europe and mutual efforts to reach stability in the Middle East. At the same time, U.S. policy embraces a steady buildup of new weapons.

Most of the major research and development programs in the new Pentagon budget would receive substantial increases in proposed funding for fiscal 1972. Pentagon witnesses at several congressional hearings argued last year that spending on Safeguard ABM, the B-1 bomber, the Navy's new ballistic missile submarine and deployment of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads on the Minuteman and Poseidon missiles all give added credibility to the President's foreign policy efforts. (For a summary of the fiscal 1972 defense, budget, see No. 6, p. 290.)

**The threat:** The Administration is confident that U.S. forces are designed to conform to the nation's policy of nuclear stability. This confidence is coupled with doubts about Soviet intentions.

"Soviet deployments make us uncertain whether the USSR has made a similar national commitment to strategic equilibrium," the President said in his foreign policy message. "By any standard, we believe the number of Soviet strategic forces now exceeds the level needed for deterrence."

**Flexible response:** Defense planners fear that a strengthening of Soviet strategic forces will weaken any deterrent effect that U.S. strategic forces have on Soviet military moves that might trigger a nuclear exchange.

This link between strategic forces and possible Soviet boldness is of particular concern in North Atlantic Treaty Organization planning, where ensuring the credibility of the U.S. pledge of its strategic forces has been a central problem since NATO was formed.

President Kennedy in 1961 had characterized the situation as a "choice between humiliation and all-out nuclear action."

Similarly, Mr. Nixon said in his message: "No NATO leader should be left with the choice between capitulation and immediate resort to general nuclear war."

#### DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. SALT POSITION

The U.S. negotiating position at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks is the product of lengthy deliberations that have gone through several phases since the Nixon Administration began.

**Groundwork:** The SALT talks were slated to begin in August 1968, during the Johnson Administration. But they were postponed when the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia a few days before the scheduled opening session. (For details of events leading to SALT, see Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 136.)

A U.S. position calling for a ban on ABM systems had been prepared by an ad hoc group in the Office of the Defense Secretary. According to a former Defense Department systems analyst, who declined to be quoted by name, there was little interdepartmental coordination or special analysis of that original proposal.

Internal Pentagon disagreement over the Administration's decision in 1967 to proceed with an ABM, the Army's Sentinel system, was the impetus for an ABM ban.

**Nixon reassessment:** At the start of the Nixon Administration a wide-ranging reassessment of U.S. policy was initiated. The SALT talks were delayed further.

An early National Security Strategy Memorandum directed the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to study SALT options. A group was then set up, headed by Philip J. Farley, ACDA deputy director.

The ACDA study produced four possible combinations of limitations on offensive and defensive weapons, and presented arguments about the risks and benefits of each.

The President gave the go ahead in June 1969 for U.S. participation in the talks, which began the following November.

**Verification Panel:** Henry A. Klissenger, assistant to the President for national security affairs, organized a Verification Panel in the early summer of 1969 to prepare for the upcoming talks and to study arms control issues on an interdepartmental basis.

**Laurence E. Lynn Jr.,** formerly with the Pentagon Office of Systems Analysis, directed Verification Panel analysis as chairman of the Verification Panel Working Group.

Lynn's principal deputy as coordinator of working level analysis was **Walter B. Slocombe.** Slocombe and his assistant, **R. James Woolsey,** were both alumni of Pentagon systems analysis.

**Analysis:** The National Security Council directed a thorough study of SALT options by the Verification Panel, focusing on a detailed technical assessment of the problems of verifying compliance with each of a number of possible agreements. Special attention was directed to "lead time" problems—assessing what threats might be posed to the U.S. deterrent from the lag in time between the discovery of cheating by the Soviets and the deployment of a U.S. response.

Various ways of limiting each of the categories of strategic weapons—bombers, land-based missiles, sea-based missiles and defensive systems—were studied in light of the NSC directive.

**Post-talk studies:** Studies by the Verification Panel were the basis for initial probing and preliminary discussions with the Soviets at the first round of SALT talks at Helsinki in November 1969.

After the Helsinki round and throughout the winter of 1970, the Verification Panel system inaugurated so-called "Task Y" studies of specific arms control options, based in part on an assessment of Soviet views gained at the first talks.

Twelve major studies of arms control problems were made. Specific questions were studied in a number of ad hoc interagency groups.

Several technical studies concerning in particular the "leadtime" question, were farmed out to Pentagon offices. The process was coordinated by a SALT backup group composed of officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Research and Engineering, Systems Analysis and other offices. They were supported by analysts from the Rand Corp. and other research firms.

The analyses were subjected to challenge where disagreements arose over interpretations of Soviet capabilities, the difficulties of detection, the probability of cheating and a number of other issues.

**"Building blocks":** Seven different packages with variations of possible combinations of offensive and defensive weapons were readied for the second round of the talks, which began in Vienna in April 1970. The arguments within the Administration on the risks and benefits of each of the options were summarized, further refined in sessions of the Verification Panel itself and passed up to the NSC.

These options, called "building blocks," give flexibility and coherence to U.S. positions at SALT, since, in the Administration view, they can be combined or reordered in different clusters or combinations to give alternative proposals, with the risks and benefits of each worked out beforehand.

This allows quick response to Soviet moves at SALT because substantive elements of policy have already been worked out within the Administration. It also minimizes bureaucratic jockeying over each new point as the negotiations progress.



Lynn, Slocombe roles: NSC officials, past and present, credit Lynn and Slocombe with major roles in pushing through the kinds of studies wanted by Kissinger.

"They kept the working level people doing good analysis," one former NSC staff member said. "They ensured that there was no falling off into rhetoric and, probably most important, they made sure all sides were treated fairly."

The studies were drawn together in a "some believe, others believe" format, according to one participant in the process. Many of the longer studies were summarized for the Verification Panel. The whole was refined into a series of options for the NSC and the President. The resulting options remain the basis for U.S. policy on SALT.

Lynn, Slocombe and Woolsey all have left the NSC. Lynn, who is on the faculty of the Stanford Graduate School of Business, still serves as a consultant. Lynn was nominated April 21 to be an assistant HEW secretary.

#### PART II

#### DEFENSE REPORT/SLOW PACE OF SALT NEGOTIATIONS PROMPTS PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE IN U.S. POSITION

(By Samuel C. Orr)

The Nixon Administration is under increasing pressure to shift its basic negotiating position at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union.

With the nuclear arms race showing little sign of abatement, several Democratic Senators have joined influential scientists in suggesting that the United States be more conciliatory toward an ABMs-only agreement proposed at SALT by the Soviets.

Under the Senators' proposals, an ABM agreement would be tied to a freeze on offensive weapons while the talks continue. The Administration has been adamant that any agreement must cover both offensive and defensive weapons systems.

Congress generally has had little to say about SALT bargaining strategy, although two-thirds of the Senate would have to ratify any treaty resulting from the talks. The slow pace of the negotiations has spurred Members to seek ways of removing stumbling blocks to an agreement.

**SALT issues:** The overriding U.S. aim since the talks began in November 1969 has been an agreement that would limit the Soviet Union's powerful SS-9 missile.

This aim and the basic U.S. negotiating strategy at SALT are products of an elaborate interdepartmental committee system established under the aegis of the National Security Council.

The system centralizes SALT issues in the Verification Panel, which is headed by Henry A. Kissinger, assistant to the President for national security affairs and staff director of the NSC.

The Administration has used this complicated machinery to grapple with the complexities involved in negotiating arms control limitations.

One of the most intricate problems concerns the difficulty of verifying Soviet compliance with any ban on the deployment or testing of multiple warheads.

The Administration has begun deploying a sophisticated multiple warhead system (MIRV) on its land-based Minuteman and sea-based Poseidon missiles.

Meanwhile, the United States has refused at SALT to pursue a MIRV limitation because of the verification difficulties involved.

**Opposition:** The Administration's SALT strategy is challenged—in Congress and among the President's critics in the scientific community—as exaggerating the verification problems, as risking the long-term advantages of an ABM agreement in trying to get an offensive weapons agreement that will

solve few problems, and as rationalizing the continued deployment of U.S. weapons, such as MIRV and ABM.

Arms control advocates argue that an agreement which does not cover MIRV systems would not be meaningful and that continuing U.S. deployment of MIRV missiles may have jeopardized the chances of getting a ban on MIRVs at SALT. But they maintain that the future stability of the arms race requires renewed efforts to get a ban on MIRV weapons.

**Secrecy:** By agreement with the Soviets, details of the negotiations are secret. But much of the substance has been reported in the press. And the President, in his Feb 25 foreign policy message, gave a general account of what has happened and his interpretation of what the issues are.

The U.S. aims and negotiating strategy clearly reflect the doubts about Soviet intentions that are expressed throughout the President's message.

They also reflect an acute sense of the threat that the SS-9 and other Soviet missiles might pose to the United States.

Because of the sensitive nature of the talks, and the protective secrecy surrounding them, few of the officials involved in making U.S. SALT policy would speak for attribution in *National Journal* interviews.

#### NEGOTIATING STRATEGY

The Administration's cautious, step-by-step approach to SALT calls for continuing major U.S. weapons programs while positions incorporating basic U.S. aims are being presented at the talks.

**Leverage:** U.S. weapons programs, in particular the Safeguard ABM, are defended by the President as supplying needed incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously. The programs have regularly been defended as essential bargaining chips in the overriding aim of negotiating a halt in the deployment of the Soviet SS-9 missile.

Administration officials questioned by *National Journal* defended the *bargaining chip* notion strongly, arguing that Safeguard complicates the targeting problems for Soviet planners who might be considering a first-strike policy and that it signals to them that it will be very expensive for them to try.

The alternative of negotiating should appear more desirable to the Soviets, in this view, if the United States demonstrates its willingness to respond with weapons of its own to any continued deployment of Soviet weapons.

**Bargaining:** Administration officials also offer the argument that it is simply bad negotiating strategy to give up something unilaterally during a negotiation.

**Signals:** The President, in his foreign policy message, emphasized that the United States has tried to signify its interest in stability in the strategic balance through the defensive intent of the new systems coming into the U.S. arsenal.

Officials say the United States has no new offensive missile, has not expanded the number of Minuteman sites or Polaris/Poseidon submarines, does not have the combinations of yield, accuracy and total numbers of warheads—even in its MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) system—to launch a first strike, and has tailored the Safeguard ABM to emphasize its stabilizing effects on the arms race.

A senior NSC staff member acknowledged, however, that any prudent Soviet planner would have to assume that the United States could acquire the capacity for a first strike. "That's all the more incentive for him to negotiate, just the way we're trying to negotiate away their first strike threat," he said.

**Caution:** NSC officials say another general view guiding U.S. bargaining at SALT is the need to approach the talks with caution and a realistic assessment, reached after pre-

liminary discussions with the Soviets, of what kind of agreement can be expected to emerge.

"You don't start out in any negotiating situation by putting all your cards on the table," one NSC official said.

**First things first:**—This has led to a negotiating strategy that emphasizes strict focus on achieving the minimum short-range U.S. aims, the principal one being a limit on the Soviet SS-9 missile, and leaves complicated secondary options until later.

This is a principal reason offered for not responding to the Soviet desire to include in the current talks the U.S. fighter-bombers based in Europe and on carriers in the Mediterranean.

Administration officials feel these weapons should be discussed in negotiations on mutual force reductions in Europe, along with Soviet missiles targeted on Europe.

Other possible areas of agreement—on antisubmarine warfare systems, or antisatellite systems—are not on the agenda, and the extremely complicated process of negotiating mutual reductions or controls on specific kinds of weapons has been given secondary priority in the U.S. proposal for a general ceiling on all offensive weapons.

**Rejected measures:**—In addition, to maintain pressure behind the basic U.S. aims, the Administration has rejected several interim measures. Consideration was given at various times by the Administration to moratoriums on all deployments of new strategic systems, on MIRV deployments and on ABM deployments, pending the outcome of the formal talks.

#### ARMS CONTROL OPTIONS

The Administration studied during preparations for SALT—and has reconsidered at various times since—a wide range of approaches to controlling strategic weapons.

Offensive and defensive weapons each present different sets of problems, and the problems are complicated by the numerous possible combinations of different approaches to limiting offensive or defensive weapons.

Actual negotiations are made more difficult by the basic assumption in arms control discussions that no agreement is viable unless compliance with its terms can be verified by both sides independently.

**Disparities:** The differences in the strategic forces of the United States and the Soviet Union further complicate negotiations.

The United States has many more bombers and ballistic missile submarines. The Soviets have deployed larger numbers of ICBMs and the large SS-9 missile, for which the United States has no counterpart. The Soviets have a limited ABM system around Moscow, while the United States is just starting deployment of the Safeguard system.

The U.S. lead in every significant area of strategic weapons technology—missile accuracy, reliability and retargetability; multiple warheads; solid-fueled rockets, and a wide variety of advances in penetration aids for bombers and missiles—further complicates negotiations.

The Administration's pre-SALT analysis produced several alternative approaches to SALT, joining combinations of offensive and defensive limits, with each containing a number of variables in certain details.

**Gross ceiling:** Limiting offensive weapons presents problems both in agreeing on the form of the limitations and in satisfying strong concerns about the possibility of undetected cheating, a particular worry for the Pentagon.

One approach to offensive limits is to settle on the number of delivery vehicles—missiles and bombers—each side will be allowed to have, without setting limits on each category of weapons.

Within this gross ceiling, bombers, for example, could be replaced by missiles, or land-based systems, by ballistic missile sub-



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marines. Also, old weapons could be replaced by newer ones.

Negotiating a gross ceiling is considered relatively easy, once both sides are agreed on what weapons on each side constitute strategic weapons. But setting a ceiling leaves a number of problems unsolved.

Improvements in existing systems, in particular, the addition of MIRV warheads of increasing accuracy, would be permitted. Replacing old systems with more advanced ones would continue.

Pressure for ways to preserve land-based systems in the face of increasingly accurate MIRV warheads could result in expensive efforts to "super-harden" missile silos or deploy mobile ICBMs, which make accurate verification of the agreement difficult.

Categorical ceilings. Another approach to limiting offensive weapons is to negotiate a ceiling for each category of weapons—ICBMs, bombers and submarines—with no allowances for changing the mix.

The asymmetries between U.S. and Soviet forces complicate this kind of approach. One suggestion under the approach is to allow the Soviets to build an agreed-upon number of additional missile submarines, while the United States agrees to eliminate some of its bombers.

In another variation, large missiles such as the SS-9 would be distinguished from smaller missiles, like the Minuteman and the SS-11, with ceilings for each.

The categorical approach helps avoid the problems of large numbers of more effective new weapons being substituted for obsolescent weapons, missile for bombers, for example. But qualitative improvements such as MIRV would still be allowed, as well as new generation improvements in existing systems. Freezes: Another approach to limiting offensive weapons would be an agreement by both sides to freeze the stocks of strategic weapons at existing levels.

The freeze might either permit or restrict improvements to existing systems—such as adding MIRV. These improvements are difficult to detect in any case.

The differences between U.S. and Soviet arsenals make negotiating a permanent freeze difficult, and there is strong Pentagon opposition to halting the U.S. MIRV programs. Allowance would have to be made for the Soviet submarine program, and the United States would have to accept the Soviet lead in land-based missiles.

Short-term freezes on deployments or on deployment and testing of new systems have been proposed several times over the last two years, generally with the freeze tied to achieving formal agreement in further negotiations. ABM limits: The feasibility of any limits on offensive weapons requires a complementary defensive ABM agreement in the long run.

Without ABM limits, controls on offensive weapons, whether ceiling or freeze, could give impetus to efforts to expand or upgrade ABM systems. In the end, this could upset the strategic balance by eroding the effectiveness of offensive missiles.

In addition, a ABM agreement would remove the primary potential threat to the effectiveness of each country's submarine-based missiles, an increasingly important goal as missile accuracy makes land-based systems more vulnerable.

MIRV complications: Highly accurate multiple warheads are within technical reach of each side. Current argument centers mainly on how soon both sides can have warheads capable of knocking out land-based missiles in their silos with a high degree of effectiveness, regardless of efforts at further hardening the silos.

Soviet missiles—U.S. planning had been based since early 1969 on the estimate that the Soviets could have the capacity by the mid-1970s to knock out 95 percent of U.S. Minuteman missiles.

This projection of Soviet capabilities assumed 420 SS-9 missiles, each carrying three highly accurate warheads. It was based on Soviet testing of multiple warheads observed by U.S. intelligence and the extrapolation of the rate of SS-9 deployments since 1965.

The Pentagon announced a slow-down in deployments of SS-9 missiles last December. Persistent press reports over the past year, never confirmed by the Pentagon, have stated that no new starts on SS-9 missile silos were discovered between August 1969 and July 1970. The Pentagon estimate of the number of SS-9s deployed or under construction has fluctuated between 275 and 300.

Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., recently disclosed that new Soviet silos have been discovered under construction. The new silos are larger than those generally associated with the SS-9.

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird told the American Newspaper Publishers Association on April 21 that the new silos indicate the Soviets have launched "a new—and apparently extensive—ICBM construction program."

A slowdown in SS-9 deployments, if not offset by deployment of a new missile, would stretch out the time period assumed for the original threat projections used to justify the Safeguard. If the Soviets do not deploy the projected 420 SS-9s, then more than three warheads per missile would be needed for the equivalent threat to Minuteman to materialize. This would further alter the original timetable, since no tests of more than three warheads have been announced.

U.S. missiles—Each new generation of Minuteman missiles features improvements in range, payload, reliability, retargetability, penetration aids and other technical advances.

No estimates of the accuracy of the Minuteman are available to the public. Scientists on both sides of the Safeguard issue assumed accuracies for the Minuteman varying from 0.5 mile to 1.5 miles. One-quarter mile is the assumed accuracy required for a warhead the size of those on the current Minuteman to have the capability to knock out a hardened silo. The smaller warheads of the Minuteman III would have to have somewhat greater accuracy.

Administration officials from the President down are firm in stating that the United States does not have—and has no plans to seek—a hard-target capability.

No serious effort has been made at SALT to halt MIRV developments.

#### SALT POSITIONS

The Administration's formal proposal at SALT, put forward at the second round of the talks last summer, combined ceilings on offensive systems with a full or partial ban on ABMs.

The link between offensive and defensive limits has remained basic to the U.S. position. In his foreign policy message the President said, "To limit only one side of the offense-defense equation would rechannel the arms competition rather than effectively curtail it."

Elements: Within the broad U.S. position are a number of detailed provisions defining more fully what would be covered.

The substitution of one type of system for another within the over-all ceiling would be permitted, with the exception of increases in the numbers of large missiles, such as the Soviet SS-9.

Improvements, introduction of new systems, MIRV warheads and other qualitative changes would be allowed.

ABM systems would be eliminated or limited to an agreed number of launchers around each nation's national command center—Moscow and Washington.

According to press reports, the Soviets

agreed generally at SALT to the limited Moscow and Washington ABM systems. There is continuing discussion of the specific details on numbers and types of radar to be allowed and of a U.S. proposal to substitute an ABM system protecting a Minuteman base instead of Washington.

Definitions: There has been basic disagreement throughout the talks over what constitutes a strategic weapon. The Soviets have insisted on including the U.S. forward based systems" (carrier-based and land-based U.S. fighter-bombers in Europe), many of which are capable of reaching the Soviet Union.

Options deferred: In choosing to seek a ceiling on offensive systems rather than a freeze, whether permanent or with a time limit, the Administration has accepted the view, strongly held in the Pentagon, that verification of a freeze is not feasible. Officials also note that differences between U.S. and Soviet forces make even a short-term freeze difficult to negotiate.

The NSC on several occasions considered other options that would have relaxed the Administration's insistence on trying to get limits on both offensive and defensive systems in the initial agreement.

One approach suggested reaching a formal agreement on ABM limits, but making the agreement conditional on reaching a later agreement on offensive systems within an agreed time limit.

Another proposal suggested coupling an ABM agreement with a mutual freeze on new deployments of offensive weapons, both conditional on later formal agreement on offensive limits.

A particular variation of this approach was pushed by Arms Control and Disarmament Agency officials last June during Administration deliberations over its formal proposal.

The ACDA plan called for arranging simultaneous U.S. and Soviet announcements halting SS-9 and Safeguard deployments, pending progress in the talks.

Verification issues: The difficulty of verifying compliance with agreed limits and the dangers of clandestine cheating by the Soviets are the reasons offered by the Administration for not pursuing MIRV limits at SALT and for insisting on elaboration of the technical details of ABM limits.

These verification issues are at the core of disagreements within the Administration and of outside criticism of Administration proposals.

It was established early in the Verification Panel analysis that there is no feasible way to verify a ban on MIRV warheads once testing has been completed.

Satellites cannot photograph inside missile silos. On-site inspection could be circumvented by switching warheads—even if both sides departed from the past opposition to on-site inspection that has hampered every previous arms negotiation.

There has been, moreover, a continuing disagreement within the Administration over the technical feasibility of distinguishing MIRV tests from other kinds of ballistic missile tests.

The U.S. decision to insist on on-site inspection of any MIRV ban reflected the view that an agreement forbidding multiple warhead tests could not be adequately verified.

In the meantime, the United States completed testing on its MIRVs and began deployment as the second round of the talks were in progress.

John S. Foster Jr., director of defense research and engineering, argued during congressional hearings in 1969 that disagreement within the "intelligence community" over whether the Soviets were testing MIRVs or warheads that were not independently targetable was itself a demonstration that a MIRV test ban could not be verified with confidence.

Scientists working on U.S. multiple war-

heads claimed full confidence that they could design MIRV tests indistinguishable from single warhead tests, so it would have to be assumed that the Soviet could do it, too.

**Soviet ABM:** Soviet deployment of a line of defense missile and attendant radars—the so-called Tallinn line—in the late 1960s was first interpreted as the beginning of a nationwide area defense ABM system. After lengthy dispute, the intelligence community assessment, affirmed by Laird in his 1969 statement to Congress, is that the system is an advanced bomber defense.

However, Foster and other defense experts continue to advise that the Tallinn system—along with the extensive Soviet radar network, the ABM system around Moscow, continuing Soviet testing of ABM missiles and the large number of surface-to-air missiles deployed around the Soviet Union for bomber defenses—gives the Soviets the potential for secretly upgrading these elements into an ABM system.

The U.S. SALT proposal spells out clearly what changes in the Soviet systems, particularly radars, would be considered a violation of the ABM limits.

#### COMPARISON OF U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES

Efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union to reach an arms control agreement at the SALT talks in Vienna are made more difficult by the differences in composition and numbers of the strategic forces of the two nations.

The differences have led to disagreement over whether the strategic balance is tipped in favor of the United States or the Soviet Union.

While there has been little dispute that the United States has been ahead in most respects, Administration leaders have been saying recently that the Soviets have narrowed the gap and even may have gained strategic superiority. On the other hand, some advocates of arms control say that the Administration is being excessively pessimistic to help justify heavier spending on U.S. weapons systems.

The table below compares the U.S. and Soviet strategic weapons being discussed at the SALT talks, based on what is known about the existing and planned weapons systems.

The United States has a substantial lead in the number of solid-fuel missiles and has begun a planned program to increase several-fold its number of nuclear warheads.

The Soviets continue to rely mostly on large liquid-fuel missiles and are slowly increasing their numbers of solid-fuel missiles.

Several elements of the arms race that have figured in the talks are not included in the table. One of the most important is the U.S. tactical aircraft force maintained in Europe and the Mediterranean. These aircraft, numbering about 500, could deliver nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. Similarly, Soviet medium range ballistic missiles targeted on Europe have been excluded, as have the antiballistic missile (ABM) systems of both countries.

U.S. and Soviet negotiators have been unable to agree on whether the U.S. fighter-bombers in Europe and the Soviet missiles targeted on Europe should be classed as strategic weapons and thus placed on the bargaining table at Vienna.

Sources for the information in the table included the annual posture statements of the Secretary of Defense, testimony by defense officials before the Senate Armed Services Committee and other congressional panels and the annual publications of Jane's Yearbooks and the Institute for Strategic Studies.

Authorities frequently differ on the range and megatonnage of various missiles. Where sizeable divergences exist, the table presents a range of estimates.

#### UNITED STATES Land-based ICBMs, solid-fueled (Deployed)

**Minuteman III (LGM-30G):** The number of deployed Minuteman III ICBMs is slated to reach an objective of 550 by 1976. Deployment with MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles) began in June 1970. Minuteman III has improved targeting, range, accuracy; its silos are being super-hardened.

Number: 50, Range: 8,000+.  
 First operational: 1970, Warheads: three (MIRV); 200 KT.

**Minuteman II (LGM-30F):** The Minuteman II is the principal component of U.S. strategic forces. Fifty of them apparently will be replaced by Minuteman III. Range, accuracy, targeting are all improved over Minuteman I.

Number: 500, Range: 7,000+.  
 First operational: 1966, Warheads: one; about 2 MT.

**Minuteman I (LGM-30B):** All are being replaced by Minuteman III at rate of about 100 per year. An earlier version has been phased out.

Number: 450, Range 6,300.  
 First operational: 1962, Warhead: one; 1 to 2 MT.

#### (In research and development)

An advanced ICBM for launch from hardened silos deep underground is in early development. Annual funding is about \$10 million, for preliminary studies only. The Air Force is continuing work on advanced reentry systems under the Advanced Ballistic Reentry Systems (ABRES) program, funded at \$100 million in fiscal 1971. The Air Force requested \$87 million for fiscal 1972. The program is directed toward increasing the survivability of warheads and ensuring their ability to penetrate enemy air defenses.

#### Land-based ICBMs, liquid-fueled (Deployed)

**Titan II (LGM-25C):** Titan carries the largest payload of all U.S. missiles. Earlier versions have been phased out. Titan has been retained because of its long range, but is scheduled for phase-out beginning in 1973.

Number: 54, Range: 7,250 to 9,250.  
 First operational: 1962, Warheads: one; 5 to 10 MT.

#### (In research and development)

The United States does not plan to develop new liquid-fueled ICBMs.

#### Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (Deployed)

**Poseidon C-3 (ZUGM-73A):** Initial deployment of Poseidon C-3, with MIRV, was announced April 1. Poseidon C-3 doubles Polaris' payload, with improved accuracy. A total of 496 missiles is planned for 1976. All 31 of the 616-class nuclear submarines will be converted to carry Poseidon, with 16 missiles on each submarine.

Number: 16, Range: 2,880.  
 First operational: 1971, Warheads: 10 (average); 50 KT.

**Polaris A-3 (UGM-27C):** The Polaris A-3 is the principal sea-based U.S. deterrent at present. It features an increased range over A-2, improved target coverage with three MRV (multiple reentry vehicle) warheads. The system will be retained on five 608-class and five 598-class submarines, for a total of 160 missiles.

Number: 560, Range: 2,880.  
 First operational: 1964, Warheads: 3 each (MRV); 200 KT.

**Polaris A-2 (UGM-27B):** This system represented improved propulsion and range when it replaced A-1. The 608-class submarines now carrying A-2 missiles will be converted to A-3s; the schedule is undisclosed.

Number: 80, Range: 1,750.

First operational: 1962, Warheads: 1 each; about 1 MT.

#### (In research and development)

**ULMS (undersea long-range missile system):** To counter Soviet antisubmarine warfare efforts, ULMS would replace Poseidon by the early 1980s. Each ship might carry 24 missiles.

Number: not determined, Range: Around 5,000.

Operational: About 1980, Warheads: (MIRV); size is unknown; likely to be comparable to Poseidon.

#### Strategic bombers (Deployed)

**B-52 G/H (Stratofortress):** These are equipped with Hound Dog missiles (range up to 700 miles) and Quail decoy missiles. The bombers are undergoing modifications to carry 20 SRAM (short-range attack missiles), which are now in production (range up to 100 miles). The B-52 G/H could carry SCAD (subsonic cruise armed decoys), which is in an early development phase. The bomber's power plant consists of eight turbofans.

Number: 255, Payload: 4 to 6 H-bombs.  
 First operational: 1958-61, Range: 12,500 (maximum).

**B-52 C through F:** Some are deployed in Southeast Asia; others are in active storage. All are scheduled for replacement by the FB-111 and the B-1. The power plant is eight turbofans.

Number: 200 to 250, Payload: 4 to 6 H-bombs.

First operational: 1955, Range: 11,500 (maximum).

**FB-111:** These are planned as interim replacements for B-52 C-F bombers until the B-1 becomes operational. The originally planned force of 263 FB-111s has been cut back sharply. This aircraft can carry six SRAM missiles. The power plant is two turbofans.

Number 76, Payload: 2 to 4 H-bombs.  
 First operational: 1970, Range: 3,800 (maximum).

#### (In research and development)

**B-1 (advanced manned strategic aircraft):** This proposed bomber is under full-scale development to replace the B-52 G/H series. It would carry SRAM and SCAD missiles, and possibly other defensive missiles.

Number: 200 to 250.  
 Operational: Late 1970s.

#### SOVIET UNION Land-based ICBMs, solid-fueled (Deployed)

**SS-13 (Savage):** This is the newest Soviet missile, first displayed in 1965. The Defense Department confirms that fewer than 50 have been deployed in four years. Range estimates vary. The SS-13 is not rated accurate enough for use in counterforce strikes against U.S. missiles.

Number: Under 50, Range: 2,000 to 6,200.  
 First operational: 1968, Warheads: one; 1 MT (estimated).

#### (In research and development)

A variation of the SS-13, developed as an intermediate range missile (2,500 miles), was displayed in 1967. U.S. speculation about a new solid-fuel missile center on Soviet construction of large new silos; however, no U.S. observation of test flights has been announced to date.

#### Land-based ICBMs, liquid-fueled (Deployed)

**SS-11:** The fuel of this ICBM is storable liquid. The United States does not rate the SS-11 as a counterforce threat. Some are believed targeted on Western Europe. The deployment rate is slowing, according to the Defense Department.

Number: More than 900, Range: 6,500.  
 First operational: 1966, Warheads: one; 1 to 2 MT.

offensive weapons, so that we are in no way jeopardizing our security. Mr. President, it is my judgment that by pursuing this course we are enhancing it.

I do compliment the team we have in Vienna, particularly Mr. Smith, the head of our arms control delegation. Their work is highly sensitive, most difficult, and complex. I believe that we owe them a debt of gratitude for this beginning approach or this beginning success.

Let us hope that the understandings that have been arrived at thus far can be translated into concrete terms of a signed agreement.

May I add that it would be in the interest of all parties if, during the time an agreement is being sought or during the time of the negotiations on the hoped-for agreement on the anti-ballistic missile system limitation, there could be a freeze on the further deployment of ABM's here and in the Soviet Union, and a freeze on further deployment of land-based missiles and the intercontinental ballistic missile-type—the Soviets with their SS-9's and the others of that family, and we with our Minuteman, Polaris, and Poseidons.

It is my judgment that the interest of the world's peace and security would be best served by not only having an understanding on limiting weaponry but also on freezing further deployment.

I am hopeful that the Committee on Appropriations, as it now looks at our defense requirements, will take very seriously the suggestion I made on March 25 of putting whatever funds we have for missilery—the ABM's and the MIRV-ICBM's—into escrow. That is not to say that the funds should not be appropriated; it is simply to say they should be set aside during the time we are working out an agreement. Why waste those dollars, particularly if we are going to have a limitation on strategic nuclear weapons. We can always protect ourselves simply because we have a technological lead, particularly in what we call the MIRV, the multiple independent retargetable reentry vehicle. We have a substantial technological lead over the Soviet Union in this area, thereby giving us that margin of safety we should require if we go into a freeze on deployment and if we put funds in escrow during the time we seek an ironclad or firm agreement.

Mr. President, I take this time to thank the President of the United States for his message today and to encourage him to proceed as he is with even more determined effort. He will have my help and my support. I do not seek to make the life of a President difficult and trying in fields of national security. I feel it is our job to work with him; not to be a rubber stamp, but to be consulted and to be willing to be consulted, to be helpful, and to be willing to advise and to be advised.

#### QUORUM CALL

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### THE SALT TALKS—PRESIDENT NIXON'S STATEMENT ON RADIO AND TELEVISION TODAY

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, the announcement by President Nixon made at noon today that an agreement had been reached at SALT to begin working out details on an ABM limitation and on the beginnings of an offensive weapons limitation has raised hope that it may be possible to reduce the danger of nuclear war and annihilation that hangs over the earth.

The President's efforts represents a step of the greatest statesmanship and wisdom. The deadlock appears to have been broken and we can hope that an agreement limiting the further deployment of nuclear weapons will be worked out in the near future.

I commend the President for his courage and hope that the progress he reported to the Nation today will result in curbing the nuclear arms race which is a growing danger to the security of this country and the world.

The attitude of the Soviet Union in joining the United States in this agreement is a sign that offers great hope for better future relations with that country.

I know I speak for many when I express my support for the step for peace in the world made by the President today.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the nationwide radio and television statement which the President made at 12 noon today.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

#### REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. As you know, the Soviet-American talks on limiting nuclear arms have been deadlocked for over a year. As a result of negotiations involving the highest level of both governments, I am announcing today a significant development in breaking the deadlock.

The statement that I shall now read is being issued simultaneously in Moscow and Washington; in Washington at 12:00 o'clock and in Moscow at 7:00 p.m.

The Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitation of strategic armaments, have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of antiballistic missile systems (ABM's). They have also agreed that, together with concluding an agreement to limit ABM's, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.

The two sides are taking this course in the conviction that it will create more favorable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic arms. These negotiations will be actively pursued.

This agreement is a major step in breaking the stalemate on nuclear arms talks. In-

tensive negotiations, however, will be required to translate this understanding into a concrete agreement.

This statement that I have just read expresses the commitment of the Soviet and American Governments at the highest levels to achieve that goal. If we succeed, this joint statement that has been issued today may well be remembered as the beginning of a new era in which all nations will devote more of their energies and their resources not to the weapons of war, but to the works of peace.

#### QUORUM CALL

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CRANSTON). Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### UNANIMOUS-CONSENT REQUEST

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, various discussions have been had with the hope that we might be able to enter into a unanimous-consent agreement which would allow the Senate, after some additional debate, to dispose of the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER) and all amendments thereto by no later than Tuesday, June 1, which would be the first day following the Memorial Day recess.

The distinguished manager of the bill, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), and the equally distinguished minority leader, the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCOTT), and I—a, the request of the distinguished majority leader—have prepared the following unanimous-consent proposal.

I have talked with the distinguished majority leader, and I have outlined the proposal to him. He has given it his approval, and that leads me to propose the request.

The Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER), the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON), and the distinguished leader are all present.

I shall propound the request.

Mr. President, I propose the following unanimous-consent agreement:

Ordered, That the Senate proceed to vote at 4 o'clock p.m. on Monday, May 24, on title IV of the pending amendment offered by the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER), No. 76, as modified, to H.R. 6531, to amend the Military Selective Service Act of 1970, to increase military pay to authorize military active duty strengths for fiscal year 1972, and for other purposes, with the time for debate, beginning after the bill is laid before the Senate on Friday, May 21, until the vote is taken, to be equally divided between the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER) and the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS);

Ordered further, That the Senate vote at 4 o'clock p.m. on Wednesday, May 26, 1971,

on an amendment to be offered by the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD) to title V of the pending amendment by the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER), with the time for debate on that amendment beginning after the foregoing vote, to be equally divided and controlled by the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD) and the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS);

*Provided further*, That a vote be taken not later than 7 p.m. on Wednesday, May 26, 1971, on an amendment to be offered by the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK) to title V of the pending amendment by the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER), with the time for debate, beginning after the vote on the amendment offered by the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), to be equally divided and controlled by the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK) and the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS);

*Provided further*, That a vote be taken at 4 o'clock p.m. on Tuesday, June 1, on title V of the amendment offered by the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER), as amended, if amended, with the time for debate, beginning after the vote on the amendment by the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK), to be equally divided and controlled by the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER) and the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS).

Mr. GRAVEL. I object.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Will the Senator withhold his objection?

Mr. SCOTT. Will the Senator withhold his objection and give us an opportunity to make comment?

Mr. GRAVEL. I reserve the right to object.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the distinguished assistant majority leader yield?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, we are faced with the fact that we have only a certain number of weeks in the year in which to get the country's business done before we go out to the people to apologize for it. If we are going to spend 6, 7, 8, or 10 weeks on each bill we will be here until Christmas, with a lot of unfinished business. We will be confronted with the same sorry, shabby mess we had at the end of the last session, which was a disgrace, in my opinion, in the way it was shuffled about, without adequate or constructive treatment in many cases, and I am not speaking critically of any individual, but Congress did not give a good accounting of itself.

Here we are doing our best to work out some sort of satisfactory agreement with Senators who have every right to be assured of adequate time on the consideration of each of their amendments. Various suggestions have been made and these suggestions would carry us so far into June there would hardly be time for the conferees to gather or for action to be taken and, thereby, we would be confronted with the situation that the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services has pointed out, which would be extremely unfortunate for the continued operation of the military services.

So the distinguished assistant majority leader, the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, and myself, with the approval of the distinguished majority leader, have proposed a unanimous-consent request. If that is not satisfactory, and the one suggested by some of the Senators does not seem to us to be

one which we could live with, speaking from the point of view of the party leadership, we do not feel we can indefinitely be a party to such delays in the Senate's business, as would bring the country down around our ears again.

Therefore, we are heading toward a situation, I regret to say, where we will have to present a cloture motion on the entire bill and all amendments thereto, and amendments to amendments, and see whether or not the Senate wants to get on with the business or whether the Senate is going to be confronted by continued and interminable delays. Again, I have no criticism of those Senators who agree to 3, 4, or even 5 hours on amendments. We are willing to accommodate ourselves to that end, but we cannot accommodate ourselves to the paralysis of the Senate's business. When it comes to that point, we are going to put the burden on the Senate. We are going to say to Senators, "We have done our best but we are going to be forced before very long to circulate a cloture motion and, if that fails, another and another and another, so that the country will know which Senators want to end the debate and which do not."

It is an unfortunate situation. I hate to say it. I think the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services would not normally favor cloture. I think he believes, as I do, in free and extended debate, but I am bound to make the statement, because I cannot meet my duties as leader on one side of the aisle unless I say it.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SCOTT. The Senator from Alaska has the floor.

Mr. GRAVEL. I am happy to yield.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, as our leaders have said here, we are faced with a situation where there must be action.

The power to induct under the Selective Service Act expires on June 30. Beginning with that date and counting back on the calendar I estimate that we must pass this bill not later than June 15, if we are to have adequate consideration, a conference, preparation of records, and the bill brought back here for final approval of the conference report, and then sent to the White House.

This subject matter is important, but it has been under consideration and debate off and on in this Chamber, in our committee, and elsewhere, since about June of last year when the major amendment was passed. We had most thorough and searching hearings. We have a complete report. There is unusual interest. In these amendments there is a question about sending draftees to Indochina; another question deals with withdrawal from Indochina by a certain date; another matter is the length and extension of the draft; and another question is the question of manpower levels. Those matters cannot be taken lightly.

As the leader has said there is no blood in my veins that wants to run in here and holler that a cloture motion will have to be applied for and voted. I have never voted for cloture. I have always made strong reservations in my mind and expressed them many times that if there

ever arose a situation where national security was involved I would be ready to make full acceptance.

There is no doubt in my mind that to carry on our military services, operations that are directly for the protection of our shorelines and our people—leaving out the war in Vietnam and troops in Europe, but only speaking of the operation of our missile bases, our carriers at sea, our polaris submarines, our ground missile groups, and many others—the record shows it is absolutely necessary under present conditions to have the inducement of the Selective Service Act. I feel I know what would happen if we did not have a continuation for a while; and I am willing to go all out, to a reasonable extent, to get it.

I appeal to the membership of this body. Let us join hands and settle our differences of opinion about the provisions of this bill in the right way, by argument, and then by vote, and put together whatever bill the majority of this body thinks we should.

May I just speak further now, I think in considering this bill, there are many amendments, and there is some choice about which ones will come up first. I do not control that, but we are going to spend the time here. However, I want to feel free, not to call up any amendment, but to debate it and discuss it after notifying the author that I want to discuss it. I want to get it in the Record, and before the press, and before the public, and I want to feel free to call up a Senator's amendment if necessary, and get it to be the pending business if possible, and start the debate on it if necessary. I do not want to do that, but something has to be done to get this bill passed.

I hope all Senators can agree now to some reasonable voting pattern. I will accommodate myself to almost anything. The leaders say they can accommodate themselves to the problem, but we will have to move the bill along. I put it up to our leaders in conference, and I put it to them now, and I know they are going to discharge it, but it falls on them as our chosen leaders to move this bill along as fast as they can, of course, in conformity with the rules and procedures of the Senate. I think a delay cannot be tolerated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Virginia?

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I object—

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I believe I have the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia has the floor.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I would like to make a few comments in answer to my distinguished colleague from Pennsylvania.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Alaska with the understanding that I retain my right to the floor.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, with respect to the comments of both distinguished Senators—and let me say for myself, I know the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER) and possibly the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES)



**SS-9 (Scarp):** This missile is the basis of U.S. fears of Soviet first-strike capability. Authorities differ on whether its propellant is storable. U.S. officials have equated it with an improved U.S. Titan II. The SS-9 deployment rate decreased in 1970, as in 1968. When equipped with MIRV, this missile could carry three five-megaton warheads or up to eighteen smaller warheads.

Number 290 to 300, Range: 7,500 to 9,000.  
 First operational: 1965, Warheads: one; 12 to 25 MT.

**SS-7 (Saddler), SS-8 (Sasin):** This is the oldest group of Soviet ICBMs; their deployment remains essentially unchanged from 1965. Some are not deployed in underground silos.

Number: About 200, Range: 6,900.  
 First operational: 1961?  
 (SS-7); 1962 (SS-8), Warhead: one; 5 MT.

(In research and development)

Multiple reentry vehicles have been tested on the SS-9 since August 1968; the Defense Department has not claimed thus far that Soviets have tested an actual MIRV. Soviets have tested since 1965 a depressed trajectory ICBM or a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), either of which would complicate U.S. defenses; but neither would be effective in a first strike, according to defense officials.

#### Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (Deployed)

**SSN-6:** These are deployed aboard seventeen Y-class nuclear submarines, each with 16 launching tubes. The Soviets are producing seven to eight submarines a year. The fuel of the SSN-6 is solid or storable liquid.

Number: 272, Range: 1,200 to 1,500.  
 First operational: 1968, Warheads: one each; 1 MT.

**SSN-5 (Serp):** This missile is deployed aboard 25 G-class diesel submarines and 10 H-class nuclear submarines, all having three launching tubes each. Some of these submarines, however, are believed to carry the SSN-4 Sarg, which has a range of about 350 miles and requires surface launch. Authorities differ on the type of fuel used by the Serp.

Number: About 75, Range: 750.  
 First operational: 1964, Warheads: one each; 1 MT.

(In research and development)

The Defense Department believes that a new naval missile is under development. In making this statement previously, the department said the missile was "probably" the SSN-Sawfly. It now confirms that this is the same missile referred to last year, but will not confirm that it is the Sawfly. Defense officials have previously stated that the Sawfly, developed several years ago, will not fit into the Soviets' new Y-class submarines. No new submarine construction has been announced. The range of the Sawfly is estimated as 2,700 to 3,000 miles.

#### Strategic bombers (Deployed)

**TU-95 (Bear):** Both Bear and Bison (below) are used for maritime reconnaissance, in addition to their roles as bombers. One version of Bear carries a single Kangaroo missile, with a range of about 250 miles. The power plant consists of four turboprops.

Number: About 100, Range: 5,200 to 7,800.  
 First operational: 1956, Payload: Less than the U.S. B-52.

**Mya-4 (Bison):** Fifty Bisons are configured as tankers. This aircraft has little or no missile capability. Numbers of both Bison and Bear are expected to continue to decline. The power plant is four turbojets.

Number: About 95, Range: 3,400 to 6,000.  
 First operational: 1956, Payload: Less than the U.S. B-52.

(In research and development)

The Defense Department says that the Soviets have produced a prototype of a new bomber, believed to be of medium range. No heavy bomber is being produced.

**KT—kiloton** (equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT)

**MT—megaton** (equivalent to 1,000,000 tons of TNT)

Ranges are in statute miles. The distance between Moscow and the northern border of the continental United States is about 5,000 miles.

Numbers of missiles are as of the end of 1970, except in the case of the Poseidon, whose numbers are as of April 1.

#### CRITICS' VIEWS

Critics question the Administration approach to SALT across the board, from broad negotiating strategy to the basic technical assumptions on verification and the dangers of cheating. Herbert Scoville Jr., former ACDA science and technology director (1963-69), calls Administration strategic weapons policy the "worst-case analysis carried to the ultimate extreme."

Scoville and others say that any agreement that does not cover MIRV would be a license for a new generation of strategic weapons.

Strategy: Jeremy J. Stone, director of the Federation of American Scientists, argues that it would be much less ambiguous negotiating strategy for the United States to hold back on deployment of new strategic weapons.

Stone said in an interview that U.S. deployments are based on inflated estimates of Soviet capabilities and, if held in reserve, would be more likely to induce negotiations than to spur new Soviet weapons deployments.

The FAS, in a formal statement signed by Scoville and Herbert York, former director of defense research and engineering (1958-61), argued Nov. 2 that the U.S. proposal at SALT threatened to sacrifice an ABM agreement for a "sham" limitation on offensive weapons.

They argue that any agreement that does not cover MIRVs would preserve the U.S. land-based deterrent only for the time it takes the Soviets to perfect an SS-9 MIRV payload capable of carrying six, eight or more warheads.

They see the Soviet ABM as the only foreseeable threat to the effectiveness of the U.S. Polaris/Poseidon submarine-launched missiles, the heart of the U.S. deterrent. The chance to get an ABM agreement should not be endangered by rigid insistence on linking offensive and defensive weapons, they say.

FAS and a number of other arms control advocates have called for a change in SALT tactics. They have advocated signing an ABM agreement as part of a two-step process in which continuation of the ABM limits would be conditional on agreement to limit offensive systems within a given time.

**ABM upgrading:** The probability of clandestine upgrading of Soviet defensive systems to a point where they would be a forceful element in a Soviet first-strike plan is widely disputed.

One ACDA official noted that Soviet "hedgehog" radars, which would be a key element in any expanded Soviet ABM system, are highly vulnerable and would have to be protected by missiles that would be seen by U.S. satellites.

Scoville says that the United States has been trying, in essence, to upgrade surface-to-air missile systems to a viable ABM for 15 years, with the Safeguard ABM as the result. Any similar Soviet effort, particularly one giving the high degree of confidence in its capability for destroying incoming warheads that a first strike would demand,

would take many years to accomplish and could be detected in a number of ways, he says.

**MIRV verification:** According to a number of critics, the MIRV testing issue is an example of Administration failure to counterbalance adequately the technical possibility of cheating against a full assessment of the improbability of the cheating going undetected.

One former ACDA official told *National Journal*: "By now it's probably a moot point, but the question for a policymaker in the White House, as opposed to a Pentagon planner, ought to be whether, on the basis of a complete estimation of probability, it's worth taking the technically possible risk that they'll cheat in order to get the presumed benefits of a MIRV ban."

"It seems obvious to me that part of the reason a MIRV agreement was not seriously attempted while it was still feasible was the fascination with its potential usefulness in a more flexible strategy."

Scoville says that it is probably too late to get a MIRV agreement because of U.S. deployment. But, "It is extremely myopic from the standpoint of national security not to give it a try."

A former Pentagon analyst said: "Actually, the Air Force should be leading the opposition to MIRV, in its own interest. MIRVs are the biggest long-range threat to our land-based weapons."

The basic argument for the feasibility of a ban on MIRV testing has been that for the Soviet MIRV to constitute the first-strike threat claimed for it, Soviet leaders would have to have full confidence in its accuracy and reliability.

While it may be hard to detect MIRV system tests that are deliberately designed to disguise the system's capability, it is improbable that the extensive testing the Soviets would require to achieve a high-confidence MIRV capability could go on wholly undetected, arms control advocates argue.

Once a test ban is agreed to, it becomes a risky venture even to try cheating, given the onus of getting caught.

**Military pressure:** One former Pentagon analyst told *National Journal* that current Administration SALT policies reflect the difficulty of overcoming the inherent skepticism of the military toward arms control efforts.

He said that the "almost limitless" technical arguments against the validity of arms control agreements generally reflect "an extreme caution about Soviet intentions and capabilities inherent in the services' planning."

"You can argue that it's the job of the military to plan for the worst," he said, "but at some point it all has to be put into perspective."

He said that the strong and sophisticated analysis and debate on strategic weapons issues within the Pentagon under former Defense Secretary (1961-68) Robert S. McNamara still produced many more weapons than were needed at the time.

"I don't see any signs that the current system is succeeding any better," he said.

Scoville says that for arms control efforts to succeed in the face of internal pressures, "the President himself has to put his full and enthusiastic support behind the effort."

#### CONGRESS

The highly charged congressional debates on Vietnam, the ABM and the Pentagon budget the past two years have masked a general quiescence in Congress on SALT since the talks began.

This reflects a general feeling in Congress that it can have only a limited or indirect role in trying to influence negotiations with the Soviet Union.

While disagreeing with many aspects of the

President's foreign policy, Sen. J. W. Fulbright, D-Ark., has remained silent on SALT. The Foreign Relations Committee, which Fulbright heads, would have to pass on any treaty arising from the SALT talks.

Support: Leaders of the committees dealing with Pentagon programs support the policy of continuing U.S. weapons development while the talks are in progress, even though some question the approach.

Allen J. Ellender, D-La., chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee and its Military Appropriations Subcommittee, said in an interview that the Administration policies are "the same old story."

"We talk peace and we prepare for war," he said. "You just can't get an arms agreement trying to negotiate from strength. The Russians aren't going to sign an agreement while they're weaker, and neither would we."

Yes Ellender feels that the President should be supported. "He's the commander-in-chief, and the people are more likely to follow him than Congress on national security questions," the Senator said.

Rep. F. Edward Hebert, D-La., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said in an interview that he would not approve of delaying U.S. weapons programs for SALT. "I don't get any great comfort out of conferences with the Russians," he said.

Proposals: A number of Democratic Senators have proposed ways to break the deadlock at the SALT talks.

The Democratic Policy Council proposed Feb. 26 that the United States accept an ABM agreement that is expressly conditioned on a freeze on offensive missiles, while the negotiations continue.

Variations of this plan have subsequently come from Democratic Sens. Edmund S. Muskie of Maine, new chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Arms Control; Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, and Stuart Symington of Missouri.

Jackson, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on SALT, has proposed a one-year freeze on new offensive missiles, including MIRV, while the talks continue.

#### STRATEGIC WEAPONS ISSUES

Laird has said that all U.S. weapons programs are designed to implement a policy of "realistic deterrence."

President Nixon said early in the Administration that the principle guiding strategic weapons decisions is "sufficiency."

However they are described, the Administration's strategic weapons policies call for increased funding for every major development program in strategic weapons and continued deployment of U.S. multiple-warhead missiles and the Safeguard ABM.

As explained in various Administration statements, this course puts pressure on the Soviets to negotiate seriously at SALT, keeps the President's options open pending the outcome of the talks, and provides an essential protective hedge against the projected threat if the talks fail completely.

The President emphasizes that a primary aim of U.S. strategic weapons programs is to convince the Soviets that the United States will not allow them to gain superiority in strategic weapons.

Policies are under review by the Administration aimed at giving the President alternatives in the use of nuclear weapons other than all-out attack. These policies have underlined the importance, in the view of Pentagon planners, of MIRV warheads for U.S. weapons.

The continued deployment of MIRV systems and the trend of long-range planning within the Administration has sparked criticism of current strategic weapons policies on a wide range of issues.

The greatest fear is that the SALT talks are being used to justify the continuation of weapons systems that may ultimately de-

stroy current chances for meaningful arms control agreements.

U.S. weapons: The Pentagon's fiscal 1972 budget proposes increased spending for a long list of strategic weapons development programs.

Funds also are requested to continue developing the Minuteman III MIRV missile and the Poseidon MIRV submarine-launched missile.

ABM—The Administration's request for funds to continue the Safeguard ABM program is geared to developments at the current talks.

The request is for \$1.27 billion, but the decision on precisely how the money will be spent has been left open. The President wants authorization to spend the money either for initial procurement of components for a fourth ABM site in Wyoming or for initial work on a site near Washington, D.C.

The Army's development work on an advanced ABM concept, Hardsite, has been merged into the Safeguard program, and the funding has been increased. Hardsite envisions using large numbers of small, inexpensive radars and Sprint missiles to provide terminal defenses for the Minuteman silos.

Foster defends the concept as a long-range upgrading of Safeguard's silo defense capability "in case the potential Soviet threat materializes in the late 1970s." The Pentagon contends Safeguard is needed as a "platform" for later improvements like Hardsite.

Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator and a leading opponent of Safeguard, argued in congressional hearings in 1969 and 1970 on the ABM that the Administration should skip Safeguard and use the money to perfect the Hardsite concept.

He argued forcefully that Safeguard would be ineffective at its primary mission—silo defense—if the Pentagon is correct in its projection of the Soviet threat. A more realistic assessment of how soon the Soviets could achieve the projected threat, he said, would allow time to develop and deploy the more effective Hardsite concept.

The Senate votes in 1970 on Safeguard were aimed at forcing the Administration to defer ABM deployment and conduct further research on the concept. (For background on the controversy, see Vol. 2, No. 23, p. 1177; for votes, see Vol. 2, No. 33, p. 1791, and Vol. 2 No. 34, p. 1851.)

Other programs—Other major development programs would receive substantial funding increases in the proposed fiscal 1972 Pentagon budget. The programs, all in the research-and-development stage, include the new B-1 bomber, the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), new missiles (SRAM and SCAD) for B-52 and FB-111 bombers, satellite reconnaissance systems and over-the-horizon radar for early warning of attack, all for the Air Force; the successor to Polaris/Poseidon, ULMS (undersea long-range missile system), for the Navy; and a new surface-to-air missile, SAM-D, for the Army. (For a report on the programs in the budget, see No. 4, p. 166; for a summary of the Pentagon budget, see No. 6, p. 290.)

Threat: These U.S. weapons programs are nominally a response to estimates of Soviet capabilities in strategic weapons in the foreseeable future.

SS-9—The chief worry is the Soviet SS-9 missile. Every increment in its gradual deployment has been well publicized. The Pentagon has estimated that the missile's power, sufficient to boost a 13,500-pound payload into intercontinental trajectory, gives the missile the capability to fire warheads up to 25 megatons at the United States. By comparison, the U.S. Minuteman, according to most estimates, carries a warhead of about one megaton.

Current estimates put the number of operational SS-9 missiles at about 280.

The United States has no military missile so powerful. The U.S. Titan II, deployed in limited numbers in the early 1960s—there are currently 54 Titans in silos—has a 5- to 10-megaton warhead. Former Defense Secretary McNamara chose to deploy large numbers of solid-fueled Minuteman missiles, rather than larger liquid-fueled missiles such as the Titan (and the Soviet SS-9), because the solid-fueled missiles are much less expensive to maintain and more efficient to operate. Also, McNamara's deterrence strategies called for large numbers of small warhead missiles rather than a few missiles with high-megaton warheads.

Defense officials repeatedly stressed during the first two years of the Nixon Administration that the rate of deployment of Soviet strategic weapons would threaten the U.S. deterrent if continued during the next four or five years.

The power of the Soviet SS-9 missile affords the Soviets wide flexibility in mixing the numbers and explosive yield of warheads on each missile. Tests have been conducted since late 1968 of a payload containing three warheads of an estimated five megatons each.

Other Soviet systems—The Soviets, according to Laird, have deployed "over 900" SS-11 missiles, which can carry warheads about the size of the Minuteman, and about 45 SS-13 solid-fueled missiles. About 200 older ICBMs have been retained by the Soviets, but are not in hardened silos.

The Soviets are building a new class of ballistic missile submarines—called the "Yankee" class by the Pentagon—comparable in capability to early versions of the U.S. Polaris. Each submarine carries 16 ballistic missiles with a range estimated at about 1,200 miles. About 17 are said to be operational.

The ABM complex around Moscow, begun in 1964 and completed last year, employs 64 Galosh ABM missiles. In addition, the Soviets have deployed large numbers—estimates run to as many as 10,000—of SAM missiles as a defense against U.S. bombers. The system includes the Tallinn line of high-performance missiles northwest of Moscow.

The Soviets are estimated to have about 145 intercontinental bombers, with another 50 of these planes outfitted as tankers.

Testing—Beyond the simple growth in the numbers of Soviet missiles, which had been increasing at varying rates since 1964, a number of Soviet development and testing programs have figured prominently in U.S. estimates of the potential Soviet threat.

These include testing of improved ABM missiles—said to have the capability of "loitering" in the atmosphere before picking a warhead to destroy—improvements in defensive radars, development of a new bomber, testing of orbiting attack vehicles to destroy U.S. surveillance satellites and a variety of testing programs aimed at improved capabilities for their missiles.

Future threat—These assessments of Soviet capabilities have been projected, with numerous variations in timing and alternative estimates of probability, to produce a long-range picture of Soviet advantage in the strategic balance.

Pentagon and NSC officials questioned by *National Journal* said that, without U.S. countermeasures or a SALT agreement, current Soviet programs could produce a situation, in the long run, in which U.S. Minuteman missiles are vulnerable to accurate MIRV warheads on the SS-9, U.S. bombers are vulnerable to Soviet ballistic submarine attack, and the effectiveness of the surviving Minuteman missiles and bombers is lessened by Soviet ABM and surface-to-air missile defense.

The Pentagon's Foster also says that the Soviet SAM missile defense system and accompanying radars could be upgraded to serve as ABMs, further lessening the effectiveness of U.S. offensive missiles, and that

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this potential must be taken into consideration in U.S. planning.

These developments would, in this analysis, leave U.S. Polaris/Poseidon submarine missiles targeted on Soviet cities but with their use deterred by the remaining Soviet SS-11 and SS-13 missiles. In a nuclear confrontation, the President would be faced with what he calls in this year's foreign policy message the "agonizing choice between paralysis and holocaust."

**Doctrine:** The U.S. strategic forces intended to meet this perceived threat are supposed to be guided by what the Administration calls the doctrine of "sufficiency." A general review of U.S. strategic forces policy in 1969 by the NSC produced four basic criteria for judging sufficiency, which were set out in a National Security Decision Memorandum at the end of that year.

**Assured destruction**—The criterion of assured destruction, which was the basis of the McNamara approach to deterrence, has been adopted by the Nixon Administration.

McNamara developed a rough measure for judging how many U.S. weapons were required to assure a level of destruction on the Soviet Union that would deter a Soviet attack.

In the McNamara calculation, used principally to counter arguments from the services for larger numbers of weapons than he thought necessary, about 400 surviving U.S. warheads, delivered on the Soviet Union after an attack, would kill 30 per cent of the population and destroy 76 per cent of Soviet industry. Increasing the number of warheads to 800 would increase the number of people killed to 39 per cent and the amount of industry destroyed to 77 per cent—not enough of an increase to justify the added cost.

**Hostage equality**—The criterion of hostage equality means, in the Administration view, that neither side should be allowed to achieve an overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons, even if that superiority would have only marginal effects in the total disaster of an all-out nuclear war.

**Crisis stability**—This criterion emphasizes the survivability of U.S. weapons, based on the judgment that vulnerable weapons increase the temptation for the other side to strike first with nuclear weapons in a time of crisis or conventional war. The adoption of "launch-on-warning" strategies as a means of overcoming the vulnerability of missiles is rejected on the grounds that such strategies increase the danger of miscalculation in a crisis.

Stability also requires, in the President's view, U.S. strategic forces and policies flexible enough to respond to a Soviet attack at the same level—to avoid the situation in which "the indiscriminate mass destruction of civilians is the sole possible response to challenge."

**Umbrella**—The fourth measure of sufficiency, as set forth by the NSC, is the continued ability to protect other nations with the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Japan, India and a number of other countries signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty with the understanding that the United States would provide the protection of its nuclear weapons as a substitute for each country developing its own weapons.

This U.S. pledge will depend for its credibility, in the Administration view, on the "thin" population defense capability of the Safeguard ABM, as China develops its ICBM force.

A "thin" ABM would make credible a U.S. threat of nuclear attack against China, in the event that China were threatening another nation. (For a discussion of "sufficiency," see Vol. 2, No. 16, p. 810)

**Weapons decisions:** These criteria are expressed in three basic guides for the design of U.S. forces: survivability, flexibility and mix.

To increase the survivability of U.S. strategic weapons, programs for hardening missile silos have been approved. Improvements in U.S. air defenses, the ABM and MIRV programs are all justified as improving survivability.

MIRV warheads, more accurate missiles, and improvements in command and control are all seen as contributing to the flexibility of U.S. forces.

Survivability and flexibility both require, in the Administration analysis, a full mix of bombers, submarine-based missiles and land-based missiles, to prevent the Soviets from concentrating research and development on defeating any one element. The mix also complicates the Soviet's problems in targeting and coordinating a first strike.

Each of these arguments supports the view that the security of the nation requires the full array of U.S. strategic forces.

McNamara coupled his basic concern with maintaining an assured destruction capability with a secondary aim of developing forces to limit the damage to the United States that might result from a nuclear exchange. One approach to limiting damage is constructing ABM defenses. Another is developing offensive missiles capable of destroying Soviet forces before they attack.

**Counterforce strategies:** The latter approach is called a "counterforce strategy"—meaning that offensive weapons are targeted on the enemy's offensive weapons, rather than his population centers.

The Administration is considering such a strategy, and it is for this reason, among others, that it has been reluctant to put MIRV on the bargaining table at SALT. MIRV would be needed if the United States were to develop a capability to knock out Soviet missiles in silos—in a retaliatory second strike, or, conceivably, in a first strike.

NSC officials questioned by National Journal say that Administration concern about crisis stability and the credibility of the U.S. deterrent, particularly in Europe, has stimulated consideration of weapons and strategies suitable for a counterforce approach to deterrence sometime in the future.

The Air Force chief of staff, Gen. John D. Ryan gave his interpretation of the outlook in a speech Sept. 22, 1970, in which he said that the Minuteman III missile with its MIRV "will be our best means of destroying time-urgent targets like the long-range weapons of the enemy."

Elsewhere in the speech Ryan made clear that he was talking about a second-strike counterforce strategy aimed at "... the remaining strategic weapons which the enemy would no doubt hold in reserve."

A counterforce capability is being reviewed, as an alternative to immediate recourse to general nuclear war in a crisis situation.

**Options.**—Officials emphasize that counterforce strategies have been considered thoroughly in the past and that current efforts are intended only to preserve these strategies as options for force planning and weapons development. Future development of the necessary forces to carry out these strategies depends, according to Pentagon officials, on the terms of the final SALT agreement.

**Programs.**—The services have paper studies under way on exactly what weaponry, force levels and crisis management techniques will be required for a counterforce strategy.

According to Pentagon officials, current U.S. MIRV systems were designed for destroying cities and would have to be more accurate than they now are if they were to be used to destroy military targets.

The Army's Hardtite ABM program is being pushed as a means of enhancing the capability of defending Minuteman silos.

According to testimony by Foster before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in

1969, the United States developed, but did not deploy, a method by which U.S. missiles could signal back whether the warheads had been sent off on the right trajectory.

Development programs are under way for satellites capable of sensing Soviet silos from which the missiles had already been fired.

Special emphasis is being given in NATO planning to the problems of command and control communications.

**Strategy questioned.**—The Administration interest in alternatives to assured destruction has revived long-standing opposition to the damage-limiting and limited nuclear war strategies being contemplated.

One former Pentagon analyst, under McNamara told *National Journal* "In theory, it's nice to have options, and the President always asks for them. Kennedy did, Johnson did. McNamara said, 'You can't have a credible deterrent based on an incredible action—that is, saying you'll blow them up and accept getting blown up yourself if they more troops against NATO.'"

"But, nobody has ever been able to think up a scenario for a controlled exchange that makes any sense. The idea of being able to control responses in a crisis situation is not credible."

The reluctance of the NATO allies to contemplate strategies that might result in the devastation of Europe in a limited nuclear war complicated flexible response planning throughout the 1960s.

The President's foreign policy report indicates that this is still an unresolved issue within NATO.

**Ambiguity.**—Panofsky notes that the technology required for a counterforce strategy—principally, accurate MIRV missiles—is the same as that required for a first strike. This ambiguity, in his view, is potentially destabilizing for the nuclear balance.

"Survival demands that we must give absolute priority to avoidance of nuclear war over the ability to fight one," he said.

Scoville and Panofsky both argue that the "key myopia," in Scoville's words, is the tendency to regard counterforce exchanges as a "pure" contest in which weapons are destroyed but no one gets hurt. They say that calculations of the number of people killed from secondary effects of even a limited counterforce exchange would make these strategies seem less attractive.

The chief worry is that the inherent ambiguity about the intentions of a country with a counterforce capability makes a meaningful SALT agreement nearly impossible and might stimulate the Soviet to consider a "launch-on-warning" or even a first-strike policy.

Policies questioned: The Administration's policy of arming while the talks continue is faulted by a number of observers.

A former ACDA official told *National Journal*, "Here we are putting MIRV warheads on our missiles and leading the Soviet Union by a wide margin in every relevant category of military hardware—why, Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard said that himself—with troops all over the world, a sound, well-focused research-and-development program and a virtually endless shopping list of new weapons, and what's the thrust of the Administration's foreign policy? What's the principal inhibiting factor in our SALT policy? The fear that a Soviet planner might get the idea that we're weakening, getting soft."

**Domestic risk.**—A congressional staff member close to arms control issues, who declined to be identified, told *National Journal*, "In the long run it is probably riskier to let some of these weapon programs get a good start than to hold up on them."

"It's bad bargaining strategy with the Pentagon, in any case. It takes a tremendous investment in time and energy and arm twisting or compromising to stop a major

weapons systems that one of the services is deeply committed to. One man's bargaining chip is another man's opening wedge."

**No hard choices**—One former NSC staff member under both President Johnson and President Nixon told *National Journal*, "You don't hear criticism of Kissinger being 'Secretary of Defense in everything but name' or complaints from the House Armed Services Committee about Kissinger and his whiz kids undercutting the judgment of the professional military."

"Everyone is more sophisticated about nuclear weapons policy now, including the Pentagon, and the budgetary constraints have forced the services to make fairly reasonable requests. But if the White House were doing anything that really threatened any vested interests, it wouldn't be all sweetness and light as it is now."

Scoville sees the Administration's SALT policies and the kind of agreements being talked about as having the potential for legitimizing, in the name of arms control, a new round of increased spending on strategic weapons.

One impetus behind this possibility, Panofsky said, is that "nuclear weapons are by far the cheapest way to kill."

#### SUMMARY OF SALT NEGOTIATIONS

Limited progress has been made at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, now in their fourth round. Following is a summary of the negotiations at each session:

**First round:** The first session, held in Helsinki Nov. 17-Dec. 22, 1969, was devoted to general discussions of strategic weapons and the problems of verifying compliance with any arms control agreement.

A basic disagreement over whether U.S. fighter-bombers based in Europe should be considered strategic weapons was first raised at this session. It has remained an issue.

**Second round:** The U.S. delegation offered for discussion two alternative approaches to limits on offensive and defensive weapons early in the second round of the talks, held in Vienna April 16-Aug. 14, 1970.

One approach suggested a ceiling on the total number of offensive delivery vehicles—missiles and bombers—for each side and a ban on qualitative improvements, particularly MIRV, to be verified by on-site inspection.

The second approach suggested a substantial reduction in large missiles, especially the Soviet SS-9, as a substitute for a MIRV ban. Both approaches coupled offensive limits with a total or partial ban on ABMs.

After Gerard C. Smith, chief U.S. negotiator at SALT, returned to the United States for consultations in June, the United States presented a formal proposal as a basis for negotiations. The proposal, based on the expected negative Soviet response to earlier suggestions, was a package linking a ceiling on offensive weapons to a full or partial ban on ABMs.

The proposal suggested that substitution of missiles for bombers or other changes in the mix of weapons within the ceiling could be allowed, except that a fixed limit would be negotiated for large missiles such as the SS-9.

**Third round:** The remainder of the second session and much of the third session, held in Helsinki Nov. 2-Dec. 18, 1970, were devoted to expanding on details of the U.S. proposals.

The Soviets suggested that continued disagreement over U.S. fighter-bombers in Europe might be bypassed for an agreement coupling ABM limits with a commitment to subsequent negotiations on offensive weapons.

The President has decided to continue pressing for a combined limit on offensive and defensive weapons. He said in his Feb. 25 foreign policy message that an agreement covering only one side of the offense-defense equation would be dangerous and might re-

move the incentive to negotiate a more comprehensive agreement.

**Fourth round:** The current round of the SALT talks began March 15 at Vienna. The *New York Times* reported April 29 that the Soviets have proposed a five-year treaty limiting ABMs to 100 missiles protecting each nation's capital. "Administration officials" were given as the source.

#### NUCLEAR WARHEAD TEST BAN

Arms control deliberations are continuing at the permanent Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, while the United States and the Soviets negotiate at SALT.

The Geneva talks produced an agreement last year, signed by 62 nations after two years of bargaining, which bans all weapons of mass destruction from emplacements on the ocean floor.

Currently, two other areas of weapons control are under consideration: a ban on chemical and biological weapons and a ban on all testing of nuclear warheads.

**Test ban issue:** Nuclear testing has been conducted underground since the 1963 agreement outlawing tests in the atmosphere. Efforts to ban all testing foundered at the time on the issue of on-site inspection.

**Feasibility**—Since the 1963 agreement, research has largely solved the problem of monitoring tests without on-site inspection. Technology has reached the state where seismologists are confident they can distinguish between an earthquake and even a small nuclear test explosion anywhere in the world.

A number of scientists, including some working for the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency, have conducted a long campaign to remove any doubts about the technical feasibility of monitoring tests seismologically. As a result, scientific arguments are no longer seriously advanced as a block to a test ban.

**Advocacy**—A number of arms control advocates, including William C. Foster, head of the General Advisory Committee for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, argue that a treaty banning nuclear testing should be sought regardless of progress at SALT. In this view, a halt to testing would effectively limit qualitative improvements in strategic weapons, such as MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles), which are not covered by current proposals at SALT.

**Administration reluctance:** The Administration has decided to delay negotiations on a test ban until it is clear what kind of controls on strategic weapons will emerge from SALT.

Gerard C. Smith, ACDA director, told newsmen at the opening of the current round of SALT in Vienna, March 15, that there was no scientific reason for not seeking a test ban treaty, but that negotiations would most likely be delayed until after the SALT talks.

The Administration's decision to give top priority at SALT to controls on deployment of weapons systems, rather than their qualitative improvement, is based in part on the view that warhead testing has gone far enough on each side for the United States and the Soviet Union to make qualitative improvements in weapons without further warhead testing.

Another factor is the general reluctance of both Atomic Energy Commission and military leaders to sign away the option of continued testing in the absence of firm weapons agreements.

#### FOSTER: NUCLEAR WEAPONS EXPERT

John S. Foster Jr., 48, the Pentagon's research and engineering director, has spent his professional career studying components of the arms race.

"Radar, warheads and missiles," he once responded to a House committee member who inquired about his professional interests.

On assuming his post in October 1965, Foster became the third (after Herbert York and Harold Brown) director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in Livermore, Calif., to move straight to the Pentagon's top research job. He was retained in the job by Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird after the Nixon Administration took office.

**Warnings:** Within the past year Foster has spoken frequently on the dangers of "the growing Soviet strategic threat." In April 1970 he warned members of the American Newspaper Publishers Association that "the Soviet Union is now about to seize technological leadership from the United States." In a *U.S. News & World Report* interview Nov. 30, Foster said the United States still has a two- to three-year lead over the Soviets. But he said that without increased defense research efforts "we would be number two technologically in some areas" by 1974 or 1975.

**Spokesman:** Widely regarded as a highly competent defender of such controversial programs as the ABM, Foster has testified before Congress on subjects other than the research budget. In 1963 he opposed ratification of the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, saying that the United States should test certain nuclear devices above ground.

In 1969 he appeared before a House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee to explain why the Pentagon believed testing of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles should be continued. Foster had announced the MIRV testing program six weeks earlier. Under questioning, Foster said MIRV was necessary to counter Soviet ABM work. He said he believed that an agreement at the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks was more likely if MIRV were developed than if all testing were halted.

**Background:** Foster began defense work during World War II when he left McGill University in Montreal to work on radar countermeasures at the Harvard Radio Research Laboratory. He was graduated from McGill in 1948 and received a doctorate in physics from the University of California at Berkeley in 1952. He then went to work at the nearby, newly formed Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, where he participated in major advances in the design of nuclear weapons. He became director of the laboratory in 1961.

#### CLIPPARD INSTRUMENT LAB, INC., AWARDED THE RCA CONSUMER ELECTRONICS VENDOR AWARD

#### HON. ED JONES

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 18, 1971

Mr. JONES of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, the Clippard Instrument Lab, Inc., was recently awarded the RCA Consumer Electronics Vendor Award for the fourth quarter of 1970. This award was made in recognition of the company's record of outstanding quality, service, and price.

The Paris, Tenn., plant of the Clippard Instrument Lab is one of the outstanding industries of the Eighth Congressional District, which I am proud to represent in this body. This plant provides employment for many residents of the Henry County area, and I, for one, am especially proud of the company's record. Mr. Bill Calwell and the personnel of the Paris plant are to be commended for their achievement as recognized by this coveted award.